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Backdating Marriage
Peter Nicolas*
Many same-sex couples have been in committed relationships
for years, even decades. Yet until 2004 no same-sex couples in the
United States had the right to marry in any state and until the U.S.
Supreme Court's 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges the right was
unavailable to same-sex couples nationwide. Due to this
longstanding denial of the right to marry, most same-sex
relationships appear artificially short when measured solely by
reference to the couple's civil marriagedate.
This circumstance has important legal consequences for many
same-sex couples, as a number of rights associated with marriage
are tied not merely to the fact of marriage, but also to its length
measured either in absolute terms or relative to a legally significant
event. These rights include social security benefits, immigration
rights, the marital communications privilege, and the rights to
division ofproperty and awards of alimony on divorce. Moreover, a
same-sex couple whose relationship ended before the legalization of
same-sex marriage may not receive any rights associated with
marriage.
This Article is the first to explore the phenomenon of backdating
marriages as a means to ensure that same-sex couples are made
whole for the harms caused by their longstanding inability to legally
marry. The Article demonstrates that the Obergefell decision applies
not merely prospectively but also retroactively, and that same-sex
couples have a constitutionalright to have their marriages backdated
to the date they would have marriedbut for the existence of a legal
barrier. Because such backdating can create significant short-term
administrativechallenges, the Article provides alternatives to actual
backdating that are somewhat easier for government agencies to
administer but that still provide same-sex couples with
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constitutionally mandated "make whole" relief Administrative
challenges notwithstanding, the Article concludes that actual
backdating-or its functional equivalent-is constitutionally
necessary to remedy constitutional harms to same-sex couples
imposed by the preexistingdiscriminatoryscheme.
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INTRODUCTION

"How long have you been married?" The question-which arises with
some frequency in social settings-is usually a simple one with a simple
answer. Yet for some same-sex couples, the answer to the question can be
somewhat more complex. Many same-sex couples have been in committed
relationships for years, even decades. Yet same-sex couples did not have the
legal right to civilly wed anywhere in the United States until 2004, when it
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became lawful in Massachusetts after a state court order.' In the decade that
followed, same-sex couples gained the right to marry in additional states
through a combination of state 2 and federal 3 court orders as well as legislative
action. 4 However, it was not until 2015, when the U.S. Supreme Court issued
its watershed decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,5 that all same-sex couples in
the United States gained the right-grounded in the equal protection and due
process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment-to wed in every state and to
have that relationship recognized nationwide. For this reason, many same-sex
relationships appear artificially short in endurance when measured solely by
reference to the couple's civil marriage date. Moreover, the length of a couple's
marriage is significant for far more than social bragging rights; it can also have
serious legal ramifications.
Consider, as an example, a female couple with children living in Oregon.
The two women began dating one another in 1996, and began referring to
themselves as a married couple starting in 1999. In 2002, the couple
participated in a religious marriage ceremony that the state would have
recognized as a lawful civil marriage had they been an opposite-sex couple. 6 In
2004 the couple purported to civilly marry one another when a county in
Oregon took it upon itself to issue marriage licenses to nearly three thousand
same-sex couples-marriages that the Oregon Supreme Court subsequently
declared invalid under Oregon law.7 In 2008, the couple entered into a
domestic partnership under Oregon law that extended to same-sex couples all
of the rights, responsibilities, and privileges associated with marriage, but with
a different label. 8 Finally, the couple once again married in Oregon in 2014,
when same-sex marriage became lawful in that state by way of a federal court
order.9 When asked in 2017 how long they have been married, should the
couple answer three, nine, thirteen, fifteen, eighteen or twenty-one years?
Of course, in a social setting, the couple is free to select any of these
answers. However, which of these answers governmental bodies choose to
recognize as the legal length of the couple's marriage can have serious
ramifications. Although many legal consequences flow from the mere fact of

1. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003) (staying
decision declaring ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional until May 2004).
2. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008).
3. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2014).
4. See, e.g., 79 DEL. LAWS ch. 19 (H.B. 75) (2013).
5. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
6. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1100 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
7. See Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91, 102 (Or. 2005). Similar events took place in New Paltz, New
York, and San Francisco around the same time. See Hebel v. West, 803 N.Y.S.2d 242, 244 (2005);
Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004). In 2013, a similar event
occurred in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth, Dep't of Health v. Hanes, 78
A.3d 676 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013).
8. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.340 (2015).
9. See Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1129 (D. Or. 2014).
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being married or unmarried, either the absolute length of one's marriage or its
length relative to some given legally significant event also affect a number of
legal rights. Some of these are rights vis-d-vis the government or third parties,
while others are rights vis-A-vis the other spouse.
With respect to absolute length, a number of federal statutes establish a
minimum number of months or years that a couple must have been married to
qualify for particular government benefits. For example, the length of one's
marriage determines one's eligibility for derivative federal social security
benefits, including the right to receive benefits based on one's spouse's
income, 10 the right to receive survivor social security benefits," the right to
receive benefits based on a divorced spouse's income, 12 and the right of
stepchildren to receive social security benefits based on a stepparent's
income."
The length of one's marriage also impacts a variety of other federal rights,
including certain immigration rights, 14 surviving spouse pension benefits for
federal employees,15 and surviving spouse pension and other benefits for
military employees.' 6
At the state level, the absolute length of one's marriage affects a number
of rights vis-d-vis the other spouse or third parties. For example, some state
laws require that the couple have been married for a specified minimum length
of time for one spouse to take an elective share of the other's estate." In
addition, a number of rights vary in scope depending on the length of the
marriage-although the rights do not hinge on whether the couple is married
for a specified minimum length. These include the amount of property" or
alimony' 9 awarded on divorce or, in some states, the percentage of the elective
share of a spouse's estate. 20
In other instances, the length of a couple's marriage relative to some other
legally salient event determines whether they will be able to exercise a given
right. For a couple to access such rights, they do not need to have been married
for a specified minimum length of time, nor do they need to be legally married
10. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b), (c), 416(b), (f) (2012).
11. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e), (f), 416(c), (g):
12. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b), (c), 416(d).
13. See 42 U.S.C. §§402(d), 416(e).
14. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(g), 1186a(h)(1) (2012).
15. See 5 U.S.C. § 8341(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A) (2012); 5 C.F.R § 843.303; Brathwaite v. Office
Pers. Mgmt., 193 Fed. Appx. 966 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Channack v. Office Pers. Mgmt., 28 Fed. Appx.
927 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
16. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1102(a)(2), 1304, 1541(f) (2012).
17. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-39-401(a) (2015).
18. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080
(2011).
19. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-82 (2013).
20. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-202, 15-11-203 (2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2202(a) (2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-202(a) (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-4-101(a)(1)
(2012).
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at the time the matter is being litigated. What matters is that the couple is
deemed to have been lawfully married when the legally salient event took
place. For example, at both the state and federal level, whether a given
communication between two people is protected by the marital
communications privilege turns on whether they were considered legally
married at the time the communication was made, not the time the testimony
was sought.21 Similarly, the legal date of one's marriage relative to the birth of
a child determines whether or not the marital presumption of parentage, in
force in many states, results in both partners to a marriage being deemed legal
parents of that child. 22
Moreover, suppose that the hypothetical Oregon couple described above
never had the opportunity to enter into a lawful same-sex marriage because one
of them died in 2013, just before a federal court declared the state's prohibition
on same-sex marriage unconstitutional. 23 If a court failed to treat the couple as
legally married based on their earlier efforts to express a commitment to their
relationship, the surviving partner would be denied not only any benefits that
turn on the absolute or relative length of one's marriage, but also any that flow
from the mere fact of marriage.
This Article is the first to explore the phenomenon of backdating
marriages, a promising solution to the foregoing issues. Part I catalogues in
detail the various ways that the absolute or relative length of a couple's
marriage affects their ability to exercise certain rights associated with marriage.
Part I further demonstrates that applying these restrictions to same-sex couples
who only recently attained the legal right to marry-or whose relationship
ended due to a breakup or the death of one partner before they attained that
right-can create serious hardships. Part II identifies ways in which
administrative agencies, legislative bodies, and courts have engaged in some
degree of backdating same-sex marriages to ameliorate these harms. Part III
demonstrates that the Court's 2015 decision in Obergefell applies not merely
prospectively but also retroactively. It contends that same-sex couples possess

21. See, e.g., United States v. Pensinger, 549 F.2d 1150, 1151 (8th Cir. 1977) ("It was clearly
established that the statement was made prior to the marriage and thus was not within the scope of the
marital privilege."); Wadlington v. Sextet Mining Co., 878 S.W.2d 814, 816 (Ky. 1994) ("The
privilege as to 'confidential communications' is restricted to communications made during the
existence of the marriage relation.").
22. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116(1) (2011).
23. See, e.g., Matt Ferner, Texas Judge Recognizes Same-Sex Common Law Marriage in
Historic Ruling: A Widow Will Now Be Allowed to Inherit Some of the Assets of Her Late Wife,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/texas-judge-recognizes4
same-sex-common-law-marriage._55fc868ae4b08820d918c3 d [https://perma.cc/KBX4-TCV5] (last
visited Dec. 7, 2015); Kim Lyons, Same-Sex Couple Receive Retroactive Common-Law Marriage
Status in Pennsylvania, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.postgazette.com/businesslegal/
2015/08/04/Same-sex-couple-receive-retroactive-common-law-marriage-status-inPennsylvanialstories/201508040008 [https://perma.cc/D9WK-JRYT] (last visited Dec. 7, 2015).
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a constitutional right to have their marriages backdated to the date they would
have married, but for the existence of a legal barrier to doing so. Because such
backdating can create significant administrative challenges, Part III provides
examples of alternative remedial schemes to backdating that are easier for
governmental agencies to administer. It also contends that such remedial
schemes would pass constitutional muster even if they treated same-sex
couples more favorably than opposite-sex couples for an interim period. This
Article concludes that although backdating same-sex marriages can create
significant short-term administrative challenges, those challenges are
surmountable, and that allowing for such backdating-or its functional
equivalent-is the only way to truly remedy the constitutional harms imposed
by the preexisting discriminatory scheme.
I.
THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MARRIAGE LONGEVITY
A.

Rights with Absolute Minimum MarriageLengths

Many federal and state benefits require couples to have been married for a
certain number of years. Among the more significant federal benefits
connected to marriage are those associated with the social security program.2 4
As a general rule, to receive social security retirement benefits, a person must
have earned-and paid social security taxes-on a threshold minimum amount
of earnings for forty quarters (ten years). 25 Moreover, social security retirement
benefits are not uniform; the monthly amount varies depending on the size of
the individual's pre-retirement earnings. 26 Thus, a person with fewer than forty
quarters of earned social security wages is not entitled to any benefit, and those
who earned relatively low wages are entitled to lower benefits than higher
wage earners.
However, under the social security program, one spouse is entitled to
receive benefits based on the other spouse's earning record if that receipt would
provide the person with a larger monthly benefit. A married person is entitled
to receive either the monthly benefit based on her own earnings or one-half the
monthly benefit based on her spouse's earnings, whichever is greater. 27
Moreover, a divorced spouse is likewise entitled to receive the greater of the
monthly benefit based on her own earnings or one-half the monthly benefit
based on her former spouse's earnings.28 In addition, under certain

24. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 191 (2d Cir. 2012), af'd, 133 S. Ct 2675,
2683 (2013); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2012).
25. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a), 413(d), 414(aX2) (2012).
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 415.
27. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b), (c).
28. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b)(D), (c)(D).
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circumstances, a minor child is entitled to earn a monthly benefit equal to onehalf of their retired parent's monthly benefit.2 9
The social security program also entitles the surviving spouse and
children of a deceased beneficiary to receive a monthly benefit based on the
deceased beneficiary's earnings. As a general rule, a surviving spouse is
entitled to a monthly benefit equal to one hundred percent of their deceased
spouse's monthly benefit if it exceeds their own monthly benefit. 30 A surviving
child or stepchild is entitled to a monthly benefit equal to seventy-five percent
of the deceased parent's benefit amount. 31
Still, with the exception of social security benefits for natural or adopted
children, 32 all of the derivative social security rights detailed above generally
require that the marriage last a specified minimum length. One rationale for a
minimum marriage length requirement is the concern that-given the very
generous derivative benefits associated with marriage-a person might enter
into a sham marriage with a beneficiary who is near death solely to receive
34
such benefits.33 Accordingly, the rights to receive surviving spouse benefits
or surviving stepchild benefits 35 require that the couple have been married for a
minimum of nine months prior to the beneficiary's death. The rights to receive
37
benefits calculated as a percentage of a living spouse's 36 or stepparent's
benefit require that the couple have been married for at least one year. And the
right to receive benefits based on a divorced spouse's income requires that the
couple have been married for a minimum of ten years. 38 Moreover, these length
restrictions-which deny derivative benefits to people falling just hours or days
short of the statutory minimums-are strictly construed by the Social Security
Administration (SSA) and the courts. Indeed, in close cases, the parties often
argue about whether the days on which people get married, divorced, or die
39
count as "married" days for purposes of calculating marriage length.
The marriage length requirements in the Social Security Act can have
important consequences for same-sex couples whose marriages appear short in
length only due to an unconstitutional barrier-as recognized in Obergefell-to
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d).
30. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e), (f).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d).
32. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d), 416(e).
33. See Weinberger v. Sali, 422 U.S. 749, 777 (1975).
34. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e), (f), 416(c), (g).
35. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d), 416(e).
36. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b), (c), 416(b), (f).
37. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(dXl)(H), 416(e).
38. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b), (c), 416(d).
39. See, e.g., Lewis v. Barnhart, 285 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2002) (concluding that the
marriage fell just short of nine months because the day of a spouse's death does not count as a married
day); Charmack v. Office Pers. Mgmt., 28 Fed. Appx. 927, 928-29 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that leap
days do not impact the calculation); Moon v. Shalala, 1994 WL 740899, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 1994)
(concluding that the marriage fell just short often years because a couple's marriage and divorce dates
do not count as married days).
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becoming legally married. Consider the hypothetical Oregon couple again.
Suppose that just three months after their 2014 marriage, one of the women
died suddenly. If the SSA and the courts legally recognized only the couple's
2014 marriage, the surviving spouse would not receive survivor social security
benefits. If any of the earlier dates when the couple expressed a commitment to
their relationship counted, she would receive those benefits. Suppose instead
that neither one died but instead the couple divorces in 2019. Assume further
that one of the women was a stay-at-home parent who did not independently
earn an income. If only the 2014 marriage was considered legally significant,
the non-wage earning spouse would not be entitled to receive social security
benefits based on her ex-wife's earnings because the marriage lasted fewer than
ten years. However, if any of the earlier dates on which the couple expressed a
commitment to their relationship counted, she would receive such benefits.
Other important federal rights granted to married people also precondition
those rights on a marriage of a specified length. Surviving-spouse federal
pension benefits for those married to federal employees require a minimum
marriage length of nine months, 40 while surviving spouse pension and other
benefits for those married to military employees require at least a one-year
marriage. 4 1Finally, the length of a marriage between a U.S. citizen and an alien
is significant for the exercise of certain immigration rights. First, the alien
spouse in a marriage of fewer than two years in length is entitled only to a
conditional green card.42 Second, an alien's marriage to a U.S. citizen is not
grounds for granting the alien spouse immediate relative status while in
exclusion or deportation proceedings if the marriage is fewer than two years
long.43

In addition, some rights granted at the state level either require that the
couple have been married for a specified minimum length of time, or vary the
scope of the right depending on the marriage length. For example, some states
precondition a spouse's right to take an elective share of their spouse's estate
on a given minimum marriage length, 44 while others vary the percentage of the
elective share depending upon the length of the marriage. 45 Moreover, many
states vary the amount of property 46 or alimony4 7 awarded on divorce based on

the length of the couple's marriage. Under any of these schemes, a same-sex

40. See 5 U.S.C. § 8341(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A) (2012); 5 C.F.R. § 843.303.
41. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1102(a)(2), 1304(2), 1541(f)(2) (2012).
42. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(h)(1) (2012).
43. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(g).
44. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-39-401(a) (2015).
45. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-202, 15-11-203 (2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2202(a) (2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-202(a) (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-4-101(a)(1)
(2012).
46. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080
(2011).
47. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-82 (2013).
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couple's relationship can appear relatively short if measured only by reference
to the date that they entered into a legally recognized civil marriage.
B. Rights with Relative Minimum MarriageLengths
In other instances, the length of a couple's marriage relative to some other
legally salient event determines whether they will be able to exercise a given
right. For such rights to apply to a couple, they do not need to have been
married for a specified minimum length of time, nor do they need to be legally
married at the time the matter is litigated. What matters is that the couple is
deemed to have been lawfully married at the time the legally salient event took
place. The two most prominent applicable rights are the marital
communications privilege and the presumption of parentage.
At both the state and federal levels, whether the marital communications
privilege protects a given communication between two people turns on whether
they were considered legally married at the time the communication was
made,48 as opposed to the time the testimony is sought.4 9 The marital
communications privilege accordingly does not protect premarital
communications,5 0 but it can be invoked to prevent disclosure of marital
communications even after the marriage has ended in divorce.5 1 Thus, in the
case of the hypothetical Oregon couple described above, a confidential
communication between them in 2007 would be protected by the privilege only
if a court treated them as legally married as of 2004 or earlier, but not if it
treated them as legally married as of 2008 or later.
In a similar fashion, the legal date of one's marriage relative to the birth
of a child determines whether or not the marital presumption of parentagepresent in many states-results in both partners to a marriage being deemed
legal parents of that child. 52 Thus, if one spouse in the hypothetical Oregon
couple gave birth to a child in 2003, both spouses would presumptively be the
child's parents only if a court treated them as legally married as of 2002 or
earlier, but not if it treated them as legally married as of 2004 or later. 53

48. See supra note 21.
49. This is not to be confused with the adverse spousal testimony privilege, which applies only
if the couple is married at the time the testimony is sought, see United States v. Bad Wound, 203 F.3d
1072, 1075 (8th Cir. 2000), but which protects premarital communications, see United States v.
Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 258 (3d Cir. 1983).
50. See United States v. Pensinger, 549 F.2d 1150, 1151-52 (8th Cir. 1977); Wadlington v.
Sextet Mining Co., 878 S.W.2d 814, 816 (Ky. 1994); State v. Dikstaal, 320 N.W.2d 164, 166 (S.D.
1982).
51. See Pensinger,549 F.2d at 1151-52; Wadlington, 878 S.W.2d at 816.
52. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116(1) (2011).
53. See Russell v. Pasik, 178 So. 3d 55, 61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (noting that if couple had
the legal right to many prior to the birth of their child and the breakdown of their relationship, they
might have exercised that right and in turn would both be treated as the legal parents of the child
whose custody was at issue).
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In sum, although the Obergefell decision and the lower federal and state
court decisions that preceded it opened for same-sex couples the door to
marriage and its attendant rights, governments precondition many of those
important rights upon the couple having been married for either an absolute or
a relative minimum period. Had these couples not been precluded from
marrying prior to those court decisions, many of them likely would have
married. Yet if the federal and state governments use a couple's legal wedding
date instead of the date the couple would have married but for the
unconstitutional barrier to marrying to calculate the length of their marriage,
they unfairly deny these individuals and their dependents rights that they
otherwise would be entitled to exercise.
II.
CLUSTERS OF MARRIAGE BACKDATING

Even with the right to marry now firmly established for same-sex couples
nationwide, such couples nonetheless suffer a legal disadvantage compared
with opposite-sex couples. As demonstrated in Part I, the delay in achieving the
right to marry means that same-sex couples are potentially denied rights that
turn on the absolute or relative length of the marriage. Moreover, for some
same-sex couples, marriage rights delayed are marriage rights denied; if the
relationship ended due to a breakup or the death of one partner before they
received the right to marry, the former couple may be unable to exercise not
only the rights detailed in Part I, but also any rights that flow from the mere
fact of marriage.
One way to ameliorate the unfairness to same-sex couples associated with
their delayed (and in some instances denied) ability to lawfully wed is to
backdate the legal date of their marriage to some earlier time. Such backdating
is meant to put the same-sex couple on the same footing as an opposite-sex
couple by identifying the date when the same-sex couple likely would have
married, but for the unconstitutional prohibition on such marriages.
The concept of backdating marriages is fairly novel. Yet with marriage
equality for same-sex couples now highlighting some of the inequities detailed
above, governmental entities are beginning to implement the idea in limited
ways. Their methods fall into three broad categories: legislative backdating,
administrative backdating, and judicial backdating.
A.

Legislative Backdating

Before extending marriage rights to same-sex couples, some states
experimented with alternative schemes-like domestic partnerships and civil
unions-that provided most or all of the rights, responsibilities, and privileges
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associated with marriage to same-sex couples, but with a different label.54 After
a brief experimentation period, many of these states opted to extend marriage
rights to same-sex couples and to allow-and in some cases force-those who
had already entered into civil unions or domestic partnerships to convert those
preexisting relationships into marriages.55
In the seven states that created a seamless mechanism 56 for converting
civil unions or domestic partnerships to marriages, the statutory schemes
providing for conversion all address an important question: Which date should
count as the legal date of the marriage? Three of these states-Connecticut,57
New Hampshire,58 and Rhode Island--treat the date when the preexisting
relationship was converted into a marriage as the legal marriage date. Thus, to
the extent married same-sex couples from these states seek to exercise any of
the rights described in Part I, they are at a disadvantage since their legal
marriage is of relatively short duration.
In contrast, the statutory schemes in three other states-Delaware, 60
Illinois,6 1 and Washington 6 2-- backdate the legal marriage date to the date
when the couple entered into the civil union or domestic partnership. Although
couples from these states are not placed fully on the same footing as oppositesex couples-because, no doubt, at least some couples would have married if
permitted long before the domestic partnership or civil union schemes were put
in place-they fare far better than their counterparts in states that do not
backdate. The seventh state, Hawaii, splits the difference, and in effect gives

54. See generally PETER NICOLAS & MIKE STRONG, THE GEOGRAPHY OF LOVE: SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE & RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION IN AMERICA (THE STORY IN MAPS) 13-14 (5th ed.

2014).
55. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-38qq, 46b-38rr (2013); 13 DEL. CODE § 218 (2016);
HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 572-1.7 (2013); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/65(b) (2013); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 457:46 (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-3.1-12 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.60.100
(2012).
56. The remaining states did not provide a streamlined means to convert the relationships into
marriages, which resulted in same-sex couples getting married in addition to remaining in a civil union
or domestic partnership, and some confusion regarding whether the couples should dissolve their civil
unions or domestic partnerships. See, e.g., Marriage Registration FAQs, OREGON.GOV,
https://public.health.oregon.gov/BirthDeathCertificates/RegisterVitalRecords/Pages/marriagefaq.aspx
#remarry [https://perma.cc/WY7D-VYFV] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016) ("We anticipate that a
dissolution of the [domestic partnership] will not be required if the partners want to be married.")
(emphasis added); Marriage for Sarne-Se
Couples in California, LAMBDA LEGAL,
http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/california-marriage-faq#12
[https://perma.cc/9ZV5-THGQ]
(last visited Oct. 11, 2016) (indicating that individuals in California domestic partnerships can marry
the same person without dissolving the domestic partnership).
57. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-38qq, 46b-38rr.
58. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:46.
59. See R.I. GEN. LAwS § 15-3.1-13.
60. See 13 DEL. CODE § 218(e).
61. Under the Minois statutory scheme, backdating is only available if the conversion occurred
within one year of when the law permitting same-sex marriage took effect. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
75/65(b) (2013).
62. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.60.100(4) (2012).
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two different legal marriage dates to same-sex couples who convert their civil
unions into marriages. Under Hawaii law, when the right at issue is associated
with both civil unions and marriages, the date the couple entered into the civil
union is salient, but when the right is specific to marriage, the conversion date
is the relevant date. 63
The retroactive recognition of marriages by legislative fiat finds some
precedent outside the realm of same-sex marriage. For example, in the early
nineteenth century, Connecticut enacted a law retroactively recognizing the
validity of marriages that were otherwise invalid under state law because the
marriage officiant was not legally authorized."4 More recently, Louisiana has
enacted laws that-while reiterating its preexisting prohibition on marriages
between first cousins-retroactively recognize as lawful prior marriages
65
between first cousins that violated state law.
Returning to our hypothetical Oregon same-sex couple, the legal date of
their marriage as a matter of Oregon law is uncertain. The couple possesses a
domestic partnership certificate with a legal date in 2008 and a marriage
certificate with a legal date in 2014, but because Oregon has no law providing
for the conversion and merger of domestic partnerships into marriages, it is
unclear which legal date an Oregon court would choose. Were the couple
instead from a state such as Washington, their domestic partnership would have
automatically converted into a marriage in 2014, and the legal date of their
marriage would have been backdated to 2008.66 Thus, in 2017, Washington law
would consider the couple's marriage nine years old for any right under
Washington law for which marriage duration is relevant. Moreover, to the
extent that the federal government defers-as it typically does-to state law to
determine marriage validity, 67 their marriage would likewise be deemed to be
nine years old for purposes of any federal rights that turn on marriage duration.
If instead the couple were from a state like Rhode Island, the state would not
backdate the legal date of their marriage and would consider their marriage
only three years old in 2017.68
Legislative backdating of same-sex marriages is an important tool to help
make same-sex couples whole, but it suffers from three significant limitations.
First, it is available only to the small percentage of couples who satisfy three
criteria: (1) they reside in a state that previously allowed same-sex couples to

63. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-1.7 (2013).
64. See Town of Goshen v. Town of Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 213 (1822).
65. See Ghasserni v. Ghassemi, 998 So. 2d 731, 743-47 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
66. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.60.100.
67. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (treating couple as married for purposes of
derivative social security benefits if they have a valid marriage under state law); United States v.
Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747-48 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that whether the federal spousal privileges
apply turns on the existence of a valid marriage as determined by state law). See generally United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691-92 (2013).
68. See R-I. GEN. LAWS § 15-3.1-13 (2014).
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enter into civil unions, domestic partnerships, or some other alternative to
marriage; (2) the couple actually entered into such a relationship; and (3) the
state is one of the handful that has legislatively provided for backdating.
Couples living in states that had no marriage alternatives or that had such
schemes but failed to legislatively provide for backdating receive no relief.
Second, even for couples fortunate to live in states with backdating,
legislative backdating is incomplete, for it only backdates the relationship to
the date when the couple entered into the civil union or domestic partnership
relationship. Because these alternative relationship schemes were instituted
fairly recently, the backdating still fails to take into account the many years or
decades that some of these couples were together and would have married but
for the legal barrier to marriage. In addition, even if the couple's relationship
became serious only after the legalization of civil unions or domestic
partnerships in their state, the couple may have opted not to enter into the
alternative relationship scheme for reasons other than a lack of a lifelong
commitment to one another. Some couples may have declined to enter into
such relationships because they viewed the alternative schemes as inferior and
were holding out for marriage rights, 69 while others may have declined to enter
into them-and indeed even into state-sanctioned marriages-because of the
tax and other regulatory complexities associated with federal non-recognition
of same-sex relationships. 70
Third, legislative backdating might fail to provide relief for couples in
which one of the parties to the relationship died before the state extended
marriage conversion rights to same-sex couples in alternative relationship
schemes. Unless the state interprets the backdating procedures to apply
retroactively after the death of one of the two parties to the relationship and
issues a backdated marriage certificate, the surviving partner will not be
entitled to any survivor rights that flow from marriage.
Because legislative backdating is thus of limited efficacy, the Sections
that follow consider two additional methods of backdating same-sex marriage,
administrative and judicial backdating.
B. Administrative Backdating
This Section describes the practice of administratively backdating samesex marriages to fill the gaps for which legislative backdating fails to account.
Administrative backdating involves a federal or state agency interpreting
relevant statutes to allow for backdating a couple's legal marriage date. Thus
far, administrative backdating has occurred with respect to two significant

&

69. See Barbara J. Cox, MarriageEquality Is Both Feministand Progressive, 17 RICH. J.L.
PUB. INT. 707, 723-25 (2014).
70. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694-95. Federal nonrecognition of same-sex relationships
continued until 2013, when the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act. See
infra notes 86-88.
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benefits associated with marriage: social security and veterans' benefits. In
some instances, such backdating treats the date when a couple entered into a
civil union or similar relationship as the couple's legal marriage date, even if
the relevant state law does not provide for backdating and even if the couple
never converted their non-marital relationship into a marriage. In other
instances, administrative backdating has occurred even when the couple never
entered into any sort of legally recognized relationship. Rather, agencies
retroactively recognize the date of the couple's religious marriage ceremony as
the couple's legal marriage date, even though the ceremony occurred before the
legalization of same-sex marriage.
1.

Social Security Benefits

Today, the most common way to establish a right to receive spousal social
security benefits is to demonstrate that the courts of the state in which the
insured individual is domiciled would recognize the marriage between the
individual and her spouse as valid. 7 1 Thus, the social security program defers to
the law of the insured individual's domicile for both the fact of and the legally
recognized duration of the marriage. As explained above, in most cases this
method disadvantages same-sex couples because many did not attain the right
to marry until the Obergefell decision or the years immediately preceding it.
However, although this "valid marriage" test is today the most common
way to establish eligibility for spousal social security benefits, it is not the
72
exclusive test and-having been first codified in 1957 -is not even the
longest-standing one. Two other tests-the "legal impediment" and "intestacy
devolution" tests-can result in a finding that a couple was married for social
security purposes even if state law did not recognize the couple's relationship
73
as a valid marriage.
Under the legal impediment test, added to the Social Security Act in
1960,74 a couple is treated as married for social security purposes if an
applicant for spousal benefits in good faith went through a marriage ceremony
with the insured individual, which resulted in a marriage that would have been
valid but for a legal impediment not known to the applicant at the time of the
ceremony.75 At first glance, this might seem like a suitable vehicle for
recognizing some same-sex marriages, like those that resulted from the

71. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i).
72. See Social Security Amendments, Pub. L. No. 85-238,71 Stat. 518 (1957).
73. See Peffley-Warner v. Bowen, 778 P.2d 1022, 1024-25 (Wash. 1989) (en banc); Marjorie
Dick Rombauer, Marital Status and Eligibilityfor Federal Statutory Income Benefits: A Historical
Survey, 52 WASH. L. REV. 227, 260-73 (1977).
74. See Pub. L. No. 86-778, § 208(a), 74 Stat. 915, 951 (1960). An amendment enacted thirty
years later makes clear that in the event that this provision results in a finding that a person has
multiple spouses, each of those spouses would earn full benefits. See Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat

1388, 279-80 (1990).
75.

See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(B)(i).

2017]

BACKDATING MARRIAGE

409

marriage licenses issued and marriage ceremonies performed by local officials
in California, Oregon, and New York during a brief window in 2004 and in
Pennsylvania during a brief window in 2013. Those officials stopped enforcing
state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage because they determined that such
laws were unconstitutional.76 Couples could argue that the "legal impediment"
was the requirement that the partners be of opposite sexes. Thus, the coupleswho married in the good-faith belief that this was not a requirement-should be
deemed married for social security purposes. However, the statutory provision
setting forth the test defines the phrase "legal impediment" narrowly, limiting it
to two situations: the lack of dissolution of a prior marriage (or a temporal
restriction against remarriage following dissolution of a prior marriage still in
effect at the time of remarriage), and a procedural defect in connection with the
purported marriage.77
The third test for determining eligibility for spousal social security
benefits, the intestacy devolution test, was the exclusive test from 1939, when
derivative familial social security benefits were first created, until 1957.78
Under this test, one is treated as a spouse if-pursuant to the law of the
insured's domicile governing devolution of intestate personal property-the
person would have the same ability to take intestate personal property as a
wife, husband, widow, or widower whether or not they are in fact recognized
under state law as such. 7 9
The legislative history of the 1939 amendments to the Social Security Act
does not illuminate why Congress selected the intestacy devolution test over
other tests-perhaps most obviously the valid marriage test-for determining
eligibility for spousal social security benefits. Congress may have selected the
intestacy devolution test in lieu of the valid marriage test because the latter is
both over- and underinclusive. The valid marriage test would at times result in
awarding spousal benefits to someone who for policy reasons should not
receive them despite nominally being the insured's spouse. For example, it
allows for spousal benefits in situations in which the claimant murders or
abandons the insured, where state law typically strips the person of their right
to inherit from the other spouse even though their marriage remains technically

76. See Commonwealth, Dep't of Health v. Hanes, 78 A.3d 676, 681 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013);
Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91, 92 (Or. 2005); Hebel v. West, 803 N.Y.S.2d 242, 244 (2005); Lockyer v. City
& County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 464-66 (Cal. 2004).
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(B)(iv); SSA, Program Operations Manual System [hereinafter
POMS],
General
[hereinafter
GN]
00305.055
(Deemed
Marriages),
For
[https://perma.cc/Y8YW-MK43].
https://secure.ssa.gov/appslO/poms.nsf/Home?readform
example, a procedural defect may occur where a couple satisfied the solemnization requirement by
means of a religious ceremony in a jurisdiction that requires the marriage to be solemnized in a civil
ceremony. See SSA POMS GN 00305.055 (Deemed Marriages).
78. See Astrue v. Capato er rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2031 (2012); Rombauer, supra note
73, at 260-67.
79. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, 53 Stat 1360, ch. 666,
§ 209(m) (1939).
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valid.so However, the valid marriage test could also result in a denial of spousal
benefits to someone who, while not lawfully the insured's spouse, had a valid
claim to treatment as such. It would deny a claimant spousal benefits because
she married the insured before his divorce from someone else was technically
finalized, a situation in which the claimant would be entitled under the law of
some states to inherit pursuant to the laws of intestate succession even though
the marriage is not otherwise valid.81
Yet using the intestate devolution test as the exclusive test for derivative
social security benefits proved problematic for several reasons. First,
determining whether someone was entitled to inherit personal property via
intestate succession created a lot of administrative complexity for the SSA, as it
was required to delve into the nuances of intestate succession law for each
individual U.S. state.82 Second, because some state laws denied inheritance
rights to nonresident alien spouses even if they would otherwise treat their
marriages to state residents as valid, the intestate succession test had the effect
of denying social security benefits to the nonresident alien surviving spouses of
U.S. military members stationed abroad. 83 Third, because not all states
provided relief via the intestacy laws for a spouse whose marriage was
technically invalid due to a legal impediment of which they in good faith were
unaware, the intestate succession test, like the valid marriage test, sometimes
resulted in an unfair denial of benefits to an innocent spouse. 84 The first two of
these concerns were addressed by the addition of the valid marriage test in
1957, while the third was addressed by the addition of the legal impediment
test in 1960.85 As a result, the intestate devolution test largely fell into
desuetude.

80. See Kandelin v. Soc. Sec. Bd., 136 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1943); Kandelin v. Kandelin, 45 F.
Supp. 341, 344-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
81. See Speedling v. Hobby, 132 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
82. See Rombauer, supra note 73, at 267-68.
83. See 85 CONG. REC. 13959-60, 14169-71 (1957) (discussing generally the problem of
benefits being denied to the non-resident alien spouses of U.S. service members stationed abroad and
approving a variety of amendments, including the addition of the valid marriage test). At the time
Congress was debating the issue, the U.S. Supreme Court's precedents permitted states to deny aliens
the right to inherit personal property. See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 516-18 (1947). Although the
decision was subsequently limited in some ways-in part based on concerns that states were
interfering with foreign relations, see Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), and in part based on
the application of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause to laws discriminating on the basis
of alienage, see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)-state laws denying inheritance rights to
nonresident aliens would potentially still pass constitutional muster today. See De Tenorio v.
McGowan, 510 F.2d 92, 101 (5th Cir. 1975).
84. See Rombauer, supra note 73, at 268.
85. Whether someone qualified as a "child" under the Social Security Act initially was
determined solely by use of the intestate devolution test. However, the definition of "child" was
subsequently expanded to protect those-like children deemed "illegitimate" under state law-who
would not be entitled to inherit from their father by intestate succession. For an excellent overview of
developments in the definition of "child," see Courtney G. Joslin, Marriage, Biology, and Federal
Benefits, 98 IOWA L. REv. 1467, 1487-89 (2013). So far as stepchildren are concerned, the Social
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But in 2013, the SSA breathed new life into the intestate devolution test,
using it as a vehicle to help same-sex couples qualify for derivative social
security benefits. Until then, the SSA had not been able to extend derivative
social security benefits to same-sex partners-regardless of whether they were
validly married under state law or were in a state civil union or domestic
partnership-due to a provision in the federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA).8 6 Regardless of which of the three tests for derivative social security
benefits was used, eligibility ultimately turned on a finding that the applicant
was married to the insured or was the insured's "spouse" within the meaning of
the Social Security Act.87 DOMA provided that when any federal statute used
the word "marriage," that term referred only to "the legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife," while any federal statute that used
the word "spouse" referred only to "a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife." 88 The SSA thus could not use any of the tests to provide
derivative benefits to those married to or in a nonmarital relationship with an
insured person of the same sex.
In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor89 declared
this definitional provision of DOMA unconstitutional. As an immediate result
of Windsor, the SSA began recognizing and processing derivative social
security benefit claims-pursuant to the valid marriage test-of married samesex couples domiciled in states recognizing such marriages. 90 The SSA went
even further, declaring that it would also process derivative benefit claims for
those who were not married at all, but who instead were in state-sanctioned
domestic partnerships, civil unions, and other legally recognized nonmarital
relationships. 91 Noting that the intestate devolution test was an alternative
method of establishing benefit eligibility, and that virtually all of the statutory
schemes governing nonmarital same-sex relationships provide the surviving
partner with a right to inherit property to the same extent as a surviving married
spouse, the SSA announced that it would treat those in such nonmarital
relationships as married under the Social Security Act. 92 The SSA indicated
that the date that the couple entered into the civil union or other nonmarital

Security Act has always treated them differently from natural or adopted children, not subjecting them
to the intestate devolution test. See id. at 1495-96. Instead, the Social Security Act has used the other
two tests described in this Article-the valid marriage test and the legal impediment test-to
determine a stepchild's eligibility for derivative social security benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(e)
(2012); 20 C.F.R. § 404.357.
86. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
87. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402, 416.
88. See 1 U.S.C. § 7.
89. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
90. See SSA POMS GN 00210.001-03 (Windsor Same-Sex Marriage Claims).
91. See SSA POMS GN 00210.004 (Non-Marital Legal Relationships (Such as Civil Unions
and Domestic Partnerships)).
92. See id.
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relationship was the relevant date for determining program eligibility.9 3 Since
the first nonmarital relationship scheme to provide for intestate succession
rights was Hawaii's reciprocal beneficiary scheme-enacted in 1997 94-there
were suddenly same-sex relationships that were sufficiently long to satisfy all
of the Social Security Act's various minimum marriage length requirements.
The SSA's regulations have left open the question of how to measure the
length of a couple's marriage if the couple started out in a civil union or other
legally recognized nonmarital relationship and later married, either as a result
of a conversion provision or otherwise, and where neither the marital
relationship nor the nonmarital relationship alone meets the minimum marriage
length requirement. The SSA refers such cases to its internal legal counsel for
an opinion.95 But given the general thrust of the SSA's post- Windsor actions, it
seems likely that it will ultimately allow for stacking the relationships and will
treat the date the couple formed the nonmarital relationship as the relevant date
for determining benefits eligibility.
Although the administrative discretion that the SSA exercises in
retroactively recognizing same-sex marriages is important for those couples
who benefit from it, it is rather modest in two different ways. First, the degree
of discretion exercised by the agency is fairly minimal. Although Congress
certainly did not have nonmarital same-sex relationships in mind when it
codified the intestate devolution test, those relationships satisfy the plain
textual requirements of the statute. Thus the agency was hardly overreaching in
interpreting the test to encompass such relationships once DOMA was declared
unconstitutional. Second, the agency's exercise of discretion provides only a
partial remedy for the injuries to same-sex couples caused by their past
inability to lawfully wed. Because civil unions and other nonmarital legal
relationship schemes are of relatively recent vintage and were not even
available in most states, using them as proxies to calculate the length that a
same-sex couple's marriage would have been but for the existence of the
unconstitutional prohibitions on same-sex marriages will result in
underestimates.
2.

Veterans' Benefits

As indicated in the previous Section, the modest administrative discretion
exercised by the SSA, while important to those same-sex couples who benefit
from it, will often underestimate the length that a same-sex couple's marriage
would have been but for the unconstitutional prohibitions on same-sex
marriage. A more robust form of administrative discretion would thus look
instead to some other proxy for determining marriage length. Such an exercise
93.

See id.

94. See 1997 HAW. SESS. LAWS 383 (H.B. 118).
95. See SSA POMS GN 00210.004 (Non-Marital Legal Relationships (Such as Civil Unions
and Domestic Partnerships)).
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of discretion-involving both a state and a federal agency-recently allowed a
surviving partner to a same-sex relationship to receive military spouse survivor
benefits after his partner died.
Joe Krumbach and Jerry Hatcher, a same-sex couple in Washington State,
met and began dating in 1989.96 In 2003, they had a religious wedding that had
no legal force because of their status as a same-sex couple, but which would
have been treated as a lawful civil marriage under state law had they been an
opposite-sex couple. 97 The couple did not register as domestic partners when
Washington State created a statewide domestic partnership registry in 2007.
Hatcher, a military veteran, died in 2008, before same-sex marriage was
legalized in Washington and before the state converted domestic partnerships
into marriages and backdated them to the date that the couple entered into the
domestic partnership.9 8 Krumbach applied for and was initially denied military
spouse survivor benefits on the ground that the couple did not meet either of
99
the tests for being married where spousal military benefits are involved. The
military requires proof of either a marriage recognized as valid under the law of
the state where the couple resided at the time of the wedding or at the time the
benefits accrued, or a marriage that would have been valid but for a legal
impediment of which the veteran's spouse lacked knowledge. 100
However, after the U.S. Supreme Court in Obergefell declared all state
laws prohibiting same-sex marriage unconstitutional, Krumbach's attorney
used the decision to persuade the Washington Department of Health to
retroactively recognize as valid the couple's 2003 religious ceremony and to
change Hatcher's death certificate to indicate that Krumbach and Hatcher were
married at the time of Hatcher's death.10 1 With proof of a valid state marriage
backdated to 2003 in hand, Krumbach's attorney once again approached the

96. See Jean Ann Esselink, Widower Of Vietnam Era Army Vet Awarded Spousal Survivor
Benefits, NEW C.R MOvEMENT (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/
uncucumbered/widower -of vietnam_eraarmyvetawardedspousal survivorbenefits?recruiterid
=17 [https://perma.cc/8YPJ-4GFE] (last visited Nov. 24, 2015); Susan Riemer, In HistoricDecision,
Gay Islander Wins Legal Battle for Military Benefits, VASHON-MAURY ISLAND BEACHCOMBER
4 2
http://www.vashonbeachcomber.com/news/344989 7 .html#
2015),
11,
(Nov.
After
Victory
Claims
Widower
Military
Gay
Whittenberg,
Jake
[https://perma.cc/9KHD-8EC9];
LandmarkDecision, KING 5 NEWS (Nov. 4,2015), http://www.king5.com/story/news/
[https://perma.cc/8MZC-LAAG] (last
local/2015/11/04/gay-widower-victory-va-benefit/75147680
visited Nov. 24, 2015).
97. See supra note 96.
98. See Annotated Letter from David Ward, Legal Counsel for Mr. Krumbach, to Wash. Dep't
of Health (June 30, 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter Annotated Letter].
99. See supra note 96.
100. See 38 U.S.C. § 103(a), (c) (2012).
101. See Annotated Letter, supra note 98; Letter from Christie Spice, Wash. Dep't of Health, to
David Ward, Legal Counsel for Mr. Krumbach (Aug. 4, 2015) (on file with author); Certificate of
Death for Gerald Hatcher, Wash., File No. 8-61979 (on file with author).
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Department of Veterans Affairs, which recognized the marriage as valid and
awarded Krumbach survivor benefits. 102
In contrast to the more modest discretion exercised by the SSA, that
exercised by the Washington Department of Health in tandem with the
Department of Veterans Affairs can more accurately determine a couple's "butfor" marriage date for purposes of determining benefits eligibility. Pursuant to
the social security guidelines standing alone, Krumbach would not have been
entitled to survivor social security benefits because the couple had never
married, nor had they entered a legally binding domestic partnership.
Moreover, even had the couple entered into a domestic partnership in 2007 or
2008, the length of their relationship-measured solely by reference to the
registration date-might have been too short to satisfy the social security
length thresholds. Yet by carefully examining the record to estimate the date
when the couple would have married but for the unconstitutional ban on samesex marriages and declaring the couple to be retroactively married even after
the death of one of the partners, the Washington Department of Health opened
the door to Krumbach receiving any state or federal benefits tied to a valid state
marriage. If other federal agencies, including the SSA, are willing to accept
such backdated state marriage certificates, same-sex couples will enjoy more
fully effectuated rights. 103
C. JudicialBackdating
1.

Backdating Common Law Same-Sex Marriages

One of the obvious stumbling blocks for many same-sex couples seeking
to establish a right to spousal benefits is the lack of a ceremonial marriage
certificate, or at least one that accurately reflects the true length of their
committed relationship. Due to laws prohibiting same-sex marriages, same-sex
couples were until recently unable to obtain civil marriage licenses that are the
precursors to obtaining marriage certificates.
Yet ceremonial marriage is not the only form of marriage legally
recognized in the United States. Although it has fallen out of favor nationwide,
eleven states plus the District of Columbia still recognize new common law

102. See Annotated Letter, supra note 98; Letter from Dep't of Veterans Affairs to Mr.
Krumbach (Sept. 21, 2015) (on file with author).
103. Some degree of administrative backdating is also occurring in other countries. For
example, in the United Kingdom, same-sex couples who have their civil partnerships converted into
marriages receive marriage certificates listing the date of their civil partnership. See Convert a Civil
Partnershipinto a Marriage,Gov.UK, https://www.gov.uk/convert-civil-partnership/convert-a-civilpartnership-in-england-and-wales [https://perma.cc/7RAJ-TV24] (last visited Nov. 28, 2015) (last
visited Nov. 28, 2015); Divorce with a Backdated Marriage Certificate, GRANT STEPHENS FAMILY
LAW (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.grantstephensfamilylaw.co.uk/divorce-backdated-mariagecertificate [https://perma.cc/HXN4-5Q58] (last visited Nov. 28, 2015).
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marriages,104 while another four states recognize common law marriages
entered into within their borders before specified dates.105 Common law
marriages differ from ceremonial marriages in that they originate through the
statements and conduct of the two parties to the marriage-without formal
solemnization or compliance with statutory formalities-but they nonetheless
provide the couple the same rights, privileges, and responsibilities as a
ceremonial marriage. 106 Most other states, even if they do not recognize
common law marriages entered into within their borders, will recognize
common law marriages lawfully entered into in sister states. 07 Moreover, for
purposes of federal benefits such as social security, the federal government will
recognize a common law marriage deemed valid under state law to the same
extent as a ceremonial one.108
While the criteria for establishing a common law marriage vary from state
to state, at the very least they include (1) the legal capacity to marryl 09 and (2)
a mutual intent and agreement to marry.' 10 In some states, additional
requirements include (3) cohabitation and (4) holding one's self out to others as
a married couple or being so reputed within the community. 11I With state laws
prohibiting same-sex marriage no longer having any legal force, same-sex
couples can now form common law marriages to the same extent that oppositesex couples can." 2
Because couples in common law marriages lack marriage certificates,
proving both the fact and date of the marriage is more complex than for
ceremonial marriage. Typically, a couple must provide sufficient documentary

104. See Peter Nicolas, Common Law Same-Sex Marriage,43 CONN. L. REV. 931, 934, 943-46
(2011) (identifying Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire (for inheritance
purposes only), Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and the District of Columbia
as jurisdictions where common law marriage is permitted); Jennifer Thomas, Comment, Common Law
Marriage,22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 151, 151 (2009) (same).
105. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-1.1 (2010) (recognizing those common law marriages entered
into prior to Jan. 1, 1997); IDAHO CODE § 32-201(2) (2016) (recognizing those entered into prior to
Jan. 1, 1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.12(B)(2) (2004) (recognizing those entered into prior to
Oct. 10, 1991); 23 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1103 (2005) (recognizing those entered into on or before
Jan. 1, 2005).
106. See Nicolas, supra note 104, at 933-34.
107. Seeid. at 934 n.13.
108. See, e.g., SSA, POMS GN 00305.060 (Common Law Marriage), 00305.065
(Development of Common-Law (Non-Ceremonial) Marriages); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737,
747-48 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that a common law marriage entitled the couple to the marital
communications privilege).
109. See Nicolas, supra note 104, at 935, 946; Thomas, supra note 104, at 152.
110. See Nicolas, supra note 104, at 935, 946; Thomas, supra note 104, at 152.
111. See Nicolas, supra note 104, at 935-37, 944-46.
112. See id. at 935-37, 943-46.
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and testimonial evidence to either a court or an administrative agency to show
that they have met the above criteria.' 13
Two states-Texas and Utah-provide methods to establish the fact and
date of a common law marriage before an actual controversy arises regarding
the relationship and any entitlement to rights that flow therefrom. In Texas, a
couple that has formed a common law marriage can file a "Declaration of
Informal Marriage" with the county clerk to declare both the fact of and the
date that they formed the common law marriage. That declaration constitutes
prima facie evidence in subsequent judicial or administrative proceedings
regarding the marriage.1 14 In Utah, a person or couple can petition a court to
make a finding regarding the fact and formation date of their common law
marriage, provided that they petition while the relationship is still extant or
within one year of its termination. In such a proceeding, the court determines
whether and when the elements of a common law marriage were established
and issues an order to that effect. Utah courts have described this order as akin
to backdating because the marriage is recognized as having commenced not at
the date of the court's order, but rather when the relationship was formed." 6
Most states that permit common law marriages to be formed within their
borders also had provisions in their state constitutions prohibiting same-sex
marriage" 7 that were only recently declared unconstitutional. This raises two
practical questions. First, if the historical conduct of a same-sex couple satisfies
all the elements of a common law marriage, what is the legal date of that
marriage? Second, what if the relationship both formed and terminated before
the state's ban on same-sex marriage was declared unconstitutional, such as
where one partner died or the couple broke up before a lower court or the U.S.
Supreme Court declared the ban unconstitutional?
In the wake of Obergefell, state courts in Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah
have issued orders retroactively recognizing common law same-sex marriages
that were formed before court decisions declaring the states' same-sex marriage
prohibitions unconstitutional went into effect. The Pennsylvania case involved
a same-sex couple who had been in a relationship until 2013, when one of them

113. See, e.g., SSA, POMS GN 00305.065 (Proof of Marital Relations, Development of
Common-Law (Non Ceremonial) Marriages); UTAH CODE § 30-14.5(2) (2011); Lofton v. Estate of
Weaver, 611 So.2d 335, 336 (Ala. 1992).
114. See TEx. FAM. CODE §§ 2.401, 2.404 (2005); Declaration of Informal Marriage Form,
TEX. DEP'T OF AGING & DISABILrIY SERVS., https://www.dshs.texas.gov/vs/reqproc/formsNS180_1-REV-6-15-Informal-Marriage-Application.pdf(last visited Feb. 6, 2017).
115. See UTAH CODE § 30-1-4.5 (2011).
116. See Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 794 (Utah 1994); JudicialRecognition ofa Relationship
as a Marriage, UTAH ST. CTS., https://www.utcourts.gov/howto/marriage/commonlaw
[https://permacc/K627-5LTH] (last visited Nov. 27, 2015).
117. See Nicolas, supra note 104, at 943-44.
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died 1" 8 just months before a court declared Pennsylvania's ban on same-sex
marriage unconstitutional.1 19 In 2014, the surviving partner sought a judicial
declaration recognizing the couple's marriage.120 She cited evidence that the
couple had a religious commitment ceremony in 2001, that they otherwise
satisfied the requirements for a common law marriage, and that but for the
prohibition on same-sex marriage, they would have ceremonially married. 12 1 In
July 2015, a Pennsylvania court declared that the couple had formed a lawful
common law marriage in 2001 that remained in force until 2013, and thus that
the surviving partner was entitled to any rights that flow from being a surviving
spouse. 122
The Texas case involved a same-sex couple who had been in a
relationship until one of them died in 2014, just one year before Obergefell
voided Texas' prohibition on same-sex marriage. 123 The couple met in 2004
and had a religious marriage ceremony in Texas in 2008.124 In probate
proceedings-which were underway before Obergefell was issued-a Texas
court declared the state's prohibition on same-sex marriage unconstitutional,
which prompted the Texas attorney general to intervene to defend the state's
ban on same-sex marriage. 125 A specific issue raised in the proceedings was the
appropriateness of retroactively recognizing the relationship as a common law
same-sex marriage effective at a date before the state court's invalidation of the
same-sex marriage ban.12 6 Ultimately, the parties entered into a settlement
agreement that resulted in a court order retroactively recognizing the couple's
relationship as a legal common law marriage.1 2 7
The Utah case involved a same-sex couple-Nicki Bidlack and Sara
Clow-who had been in a relationship until Clow died in September 2014,128

118. See Verified Declaratory Judgment Complaint and Amended Petition for Declaration of
Common Law Marriage, In re Estate of Underwood, No. 2014-E0681-29 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 2015)
[hereinafter Underwood Complaint]; Lyons, supra note 23.
119. See Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
120. See Underwood Complaint, supra note 118.
121. Id.
122. See Declaration of the Validity of the Marriage, In re Estate of Underwood, No. 2014E0681-29 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 2015).
123. See In re Estate of Powell, No. C-1-PB-14-001695 (Tex. Prob. Ct. 2015); Ferner, supra
note 23.
124. See Ferner,supra note 23.
125. See Plea in Intervention, In re Estate of Powell, No. C-1-PB-14-001695 (Tex. Prob. Ct
Feb. 17, 2015); Petition for Writ ofMandamus, In re State, 2015 WL 5127017 (Tex. Feb. 17, 2015).
126. See supra note 125; see also Real Parties in Interest James Powell and Alice Huseman's
Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus, In re State, 2015 WL 5127019 [hereinafter Real Parties];
Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment of the State of Texas, In re Estate of
Powell; James Powell and Alice Huseman's No Evidence Motion and Motion on the Pleadings for
Summary Judgment, In re Estate of Powell; Sonemaly Phrasavath's Response to Motions for
Summary Judgment, In re Estate ofPowell.
127. See Ferner, supra note 23.
128. See Jennifer Dobner, Groundbreaking Ruling Recognizes Same-Sex Common-Law
Marriage in Utah, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.sltrib.com/news/3352688-
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just weeks before the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review a federal appeals
court decision declaring Utah's prohibition on same-sex marriage
unconstitutional 2 9 and before the stay on the appeals court's decision was
lifted.' The couple met in 2006 and held a commitment ceremony in 2009.131
In 2013, Bidlack gave birth to a child that was produced using Clow's egg and
donor sperm, but because they were not considered legally married at the time,
only Bidlack's name (as the birth mother) appeared on the child's birth
certificate.' 3 2 In early 2015, Bidlack filed a petition in a Utah district court
seeking a declaration that the couple had formed a common law marriage
before Clow's death.1 3 3 In late 2015, the court issued an order both recognizing
the marriage and amending the child's birth certificate to include both parents'
names.1 34

The courts in the above cases issued brief orders that did not provide very
detailed reasons for their decisions to retroactively recognize the relationships
at issue as common law marriages. Yet, in deciding to backdate the common
law marriages to dates before the respective state laws prohibiting same-sex
marriage ceased to be in force, these courts clearly rejected the argument that
the couples' legal marriage dates should align with the dates that laws banning
same-sex marriages ceased to be in force. Instead, each court decision treated
the respective state's ban on same-sex marriage as though it was a nullity at the
time the couple formed their relationship, and applied the remainder of state
law governing common law marriage validity.1 35 In so doing, the courts in
effect identified the date that the couples would have married but for the
36
unconstitutional prohibition on same-sex marriage.1

&

[https://perma.cc/269D155/groundbreaking-ruling-recognizes-same-sex-common-law-marriage
536L] (last visited Dec. 30, 2015).
129. See Herbert v. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014).
130. See Kitchen v. Herbert, 2014 WL 4960471 (10th Cir. Oct. 6, 2014).
131. See Dobner, supra note 128.
132. See id
133. See id.
134. See id.; see also Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, In re Marriage of Bidlack
Clow (Utah Dec. 4, 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter Findings of Fact].
135. The Utah decision was explicit in this respect, holding that in light of the federal court
decisions declaring Utah's prohibition on same-sex marriage unconstitutional, the court-in
determining whether a common law marriage existed-would disregard that portion of state law
requiring that the relationship be between "a man and a woman." See Findings of Fact, supra note 134,
at 4.
136. As indicated above, one requirement common across all common law marriage
jurisdictions is that the parties have capacity to marry. Although at its narrowest, the term "capacity" is
interpreted to refer to minimum age and mental capacity, see Nicolas, supra note 104, at 935, 945;
Thomas, supra note 104, at 152, at its broadest, it encompasses any potential legal impediment to
marrying, such as whether the parties are already married to other people, whether the marriage would
be incestuous, or whether the parties to the relationship are of the same sex. See In re Estate of
Hendrickson, 805 P.2d 20, 21 (Kan. 1991); MELISSA DELACERDA, 4 OKLAHOMA PRACTICE SERIES:
OKLAHOMA FAMILY LAW § 1:6.3(B) (2007-2009); STEWART W. GAGNON ET AL, 1 TEXAS

PRACTICE GuIDE: FAMILY LAW § 2:93 (2011). Where a legal impediment existed when a common
law marriage was purportedly formed, precedent establishes that the relationship ripens into a marriage
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Backdating CeremonialSame-Sex Marriages

Even in states where common law marriage does not exist, courts can
examine, and on occasion have examined, a same-sex couple's relationship
history to pinpoint the date when they would have married but for a legal
barrier to doing so. Three recent cases-two involving couples in which one of
the partners died before they attained the legal right to marry and the third
involving a couple that broke up before attaining the legal right to marry-pave
the way for a retrospective review of the relationship history of same-sex
couples residing in non-common law marriage states.
The first two cases involve litigation between a surviving partner-who
seeks to be treated as having been legally married to her deceased partner for a
particular purpose-and a third party who has a financial interest in the
marriage not being retroactively recognized as valid. In this circumstance,
courts in Connecticut and California deemed it appropriate to backdate samesex marnages.
In the Connecticut case, a surviving partner had sued third parties for loss
of consortium in connection with the injury and eventual death of her same-sex
partner. 3 7 Although the couple was in a state-sanctioned civil union at the time
the litigation commenced, they were neither married nor in a civil union at the
time the injuries occurred. 3 8 The defendants sought to dismiss the action on
the ground that the law governing loss of consortium claims requires that the
couple was married at the time the injuries took place."' Recognizing the
fundamental unfairness of such a rule as applied to same-sex couples, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut expanded the common law loss-of-consortium
action to encompass those same-sex couples who would have married but for
the state law that prevented them from doing SO. 14 0 It then remanded the case to
the lower courts for factfinding on that question. 14 1

on the date when the legal impediment is eliminated. For example, if the parties were married to other
people at the time a common law marriage would otherwise have been formed, the common law
marriage begins when the parties terminate their marriages to other people. See, e.g., Martin v. Brown,
15 Vet. App. 155 (Ct. Vet. App. 1996); Barnett v. Barnett, 80 So. 2d 626, 629-31 (Ala. 1955). Indeed,
invoking this principle, one of the parties to the Texas litigation characterized the ban on same-sex
marriage as a legal impediment that went to the capacity of the parties to marry, and thus contended
that the court should recognize the marriage as valid only from the date the ban was struck down as
unconstitutional. See generally Real Parties, supra note 126, at *4-*8. By backdating the couples'
marriages, all three state courts thus either rejected the broader interpretation of "capacity" altogether
or viewed its application in this context as constitutionally infirm.
137. See Mueller v. Tepler, 95 A.3d 1011, 1014 (Conn. 2014).
138. See id. at 1015.
139. See id at 1015-16.
140. See id. at 1021-28. By expanding the scope of the common law cause of action for loss of
consortium, the state supreme court avoided reaching the plaintiff's claim that failing to extend the
right to sue to her violated the equal protection guarantee of the Connecticut Constitution. See id. at
1023 n.17. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected a similar constitutional claim by a
couple whose consortium injury arose before the date that the court announced that same-sex couples
had a right to marry under the Massachusetts Constitution. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798
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The California case involved Stacey Schuett and Lesly Taboada-Hall, a
same-sex couple who had been in a committed relationship for twenty-seven
years and had two children.14 2 The couple had been in a state-sanctioned
domestic partnership since 2001, and they held a marriage ceremony officiated
by a local county supervisor on June 19, 2013, just one day before TaboadaHall died. 143 Although lower federal courts had declared California's
constitutional provision prohibiting same-sex marriages unconstitutional before
the couple's marriage ceremony, those decisions were stayed pending U.S.
Supreme Court review, and thus the couple could not obtain a marriage
license. 1" Just six days after Taboada-Hall died, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Windsor declared the definitional provision of DOMA unconstitutional. The
145
court also handed down its decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry, which held
that the backers of California's ban on same-sex marriages lacked standing to
defend the provision after state officials declined to appeal the lower court
decisions striking it down. 14 6 As a result of Hollingsworth, same-sex marriages
resumed in California on June 28, 2013, just eight days after Taboada-Hall died
and just nine days after she and Schuett partook in a marriage ceremony. 147
Schuett subsequently filed an action in California state court seeking a
declaration regarding the fact and date of the couple's marriage. The state court
issued an order declaring the couple's legal marriage date to be June 19, 2013,
14 8
Schuett then filed
and issued a delayed marriage certificate listing that date.
an action in federal court against Taboada-Hall's employer, seeking an order
that Schuett was entitled to surviving spouse benefits from Taboada-Hall's
pension on the ground that the couple was married at the time of TaboadaHall's death. 149 The federal court agreed to recognize June 19, 2013, as the
couple's legal marriage date, noting that it was clear that the couple would have
been married on that date but for California's unconstitutional prohibition of
such marriages:

N.E.2d 941, 968-70 (Mass. 2003) (describing its constitutional holding in Goodridge as acting
prospectively only); see also Charron v. Amaral, 889 N.E.2d 946, 950-51 (Mass. 2008). Although the
Massachusetts high court was free to interpret the state's constitutional guarantee as acting
prospectively only, in future Massachusetts litigation involving rights associated with marriage, the
analogous right to marry announced in Obergefell should apply retroactively for the reasons set forth
in Part n of this Article. The broader federal right would trump the narrower right identified under the
Massachusetts Constitution.
141. See Mueller, 95 A.3d at 1030 & n.26.
142. See Schuett v. FedEx Corp., No. 15-cv-0189-PJH, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 54,7 2016),
9 2 83 7 7 4
/
https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/califoria/cande/4:2015cv0018 /
[https://perma.cc/FE5J-9RNB].
143. See id. at 1, 3.
144. See id. at 3.
145. 133 S. Ct. 2652,2667-68 (2013).
146. See Schuett, slip op. at 3.
147. See id. at 3.
148. See id. at 3-4.
149. See id. at 4.
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They wanted to marry, intended to marry, and did everything possible
to legally marry while Ms. Taboada-Hall was still alive. They plainly
consented, and had the capacity to consent. The marriage was
solemnized in front of numerous witnesses. At the time of the
marriage, California law did not permit recognition of same-sex
marriages, and they were thus unable to obtain a marriage license prior
to the event. However, they complied with every other requirement
imposed by California law. . . . Were it not for California's application
of the unconstitutional law prohibiting same-sex marriage, there would
be no question that plaintiff and Ms. Taboada-Hall were married as of
the date of Ms. Taboada-Hall's death.150
Thus, just like the Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah courts referenced above,
the courts in the California case treated the state's ban on same-sex marriage as
though it were a nullity at the time the couple formed its relationship and
applied the remainder of state law governing ceremonial marriage validity.
The third case, arising in Oregon, involved litigation between two people
of the same sex whose relationship ended before the couple had the legal
option to marry. The case addressed whether the couple's relationship should
retroactively be treated as a marital one when determining parental rights to a
child born during the couple's relationship.
One female partner in an unmarried same-sex relationship had given birth
to a child via artificial insemination. 5 1 Under Oregon law, when a woman
gives birth to a child via artificial insemination, her spouse-if the spouse
consents to the procedure taking place-is deemed a legal parent of the
child. 152 At the time the child was born, same-sex marriage was neither
permitted nor recognized in Oregon (although same-sex couples could enter
into registered domestic partnerships), and so in terms the statute was
inapplicable to the couple, who broke up before Oregon recognized same-sex
marriage rights. 153 The Oregon court acknowledged that the artificial
insemination statute's extension of parentage rights is inapplicable to an
unmarried opposite-sex couple.15 4 Nonetheless, it held that the statute's
extension of parentage rights could apply to an unmarried same-sex couple,
justifying the distinction on the ground that "same-sex couples were until
recently prohibited from choosing to be married." 55 In determining whether
the statute's extension of parentage rights applied to the unmarried same-sex

150. Id. at 7-8. The court then held that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Windsor applied
retroactively, requiring private pension plans governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA) to recognize same-sex marriages for purposes of spousal pension benefits. See
id at 9-16. In so doing, the court cited the Supreme Court's retroactivity jurisprudence, which is
detailed below. See infra notes 182-88.
151. See In re Madrone, 350 P.3d 495, 496 (Or. Ct. App. 2015).
152. See id. at 498.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 501.
155. Id.
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partner of a woman who gave birth to a child, the key inquiry, according to the
Oregon court, was "whether the same-sex partners would have chosen to marry
156
The Oregon court
before the child's birth had they been permitted to."
determination:
factual
this
making
to
relevant
factors
identified a number of
A couple's decision to take advantage of other options giving legal
recognition to their relationship-such as entering into a registered
domestic partnership or marriage when those choices become
available-may be particularly significant. Other factors include
whether the parties held each other out as spouses; considered
themselves to be spouses (legal purposes aside); had children during
the relationship and shared childrearing responsibilities; held a
commitment ceremony or otherwise exchanged vows of commitment;
exchanged rings; shared a last name; commingled their assets and
finances; made significant financial decisions together; sought to adopt
any children either of them may have had before the relationship
157
began; or attempted unsuccessfully to get married.
The court remanded the case to the trial court to make the factual determination
whether the couple would have married had they been legally permitted to do
SO.158

Together, these three cases stand for the proposition that where a right
associated with marriage is at stake in a ceremonial marriage state, the partners
to that relationship are entitled to exercise that right through judicial backdating
of the marital relationship even though they never actually entered into a legal
marriage if they can show that they likely would have married one another but
for the legal prohibition on same-sex marriage.
3.

Administrative Backdating Sparked by JudicialBackdating

In some instances, judicial backdating of same-sex marriages can catalyze
Such actuated
subsequent exercises of administrative backdating.
administrative backdating followed soon after the court decisions in
Pennsylvania and Texas, recounted above, that retroactively recognized

156. Id.
157. Id. at 501-02.
158. See id. at 503; accord Lake v. Putnam, 2016 WL 3606081 (Mich. Ct. App. July 5, 2016)
(Shapiro, J., concurring). The U.S. Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a case seeking a similar
form of backdating in a case involving child custody. See Willis v. Mobley, 171 So. 3d 739 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 805 (2016). A lesbian couple living in Florida held a
commitment ceremony in 2008. Soon thereafter, one of the women gave birth to a child that the
couple jointly raised until 2013, when they separated. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8-10, Willis
v. Mobley, No. 15-500 (Oct 13, 2015). In the petition for certiorari, the nonbiological parent
contended that but for the state's prohibition on same-sex marriage, the couple likely would have
married and under state law would both presumptively be the child's legal parents. See id. at 12-14.
But the case was complicated by the absence of published lower court opinions and definitive court
findings that the couple would have married but for the state's ban on same-sex marriage. See id. at 12,
15. In all events, a denial of certiorari does not constitute an expression of an opinion on the merits of a
case. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 296 (1989) (collecting cases).
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common law same-sex marriages formed before the bans on same-sex marriage
in those states were declared unconstitutional.
Administrative backdating in Pennsylvania grew out of litigation over the
actions of the Montgomery County Orphan's Court clerk. In 2013, the clerkafter the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Windsor and the announcement by
Pennsylvania's attorney general that she would not defend the state's ban on
same-sex marriage because it was "wholly unconstitutional"-began issuing
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 159 That year, a state court ordered the
clerk to stop issuing marriage licenses but declined to rule on the validity of the
licenses that he had already issued."'o On May 20, 2014, a federal court
declared Pennsylvania's ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional,16 1 a
decision that became final after the Commonwealth declined to appeal it.162 in
the wake of that decision, the Commonwealth's Department of Health and the
clerk sparred over the legal date of the couples' marriages, with the former
contending it should be May 20, 2014-the date that the state ban was declared
unconstitutional-and the latter contending that it should be the date the
ceremonies were performed. 163 Toward the end of 2015, the Department of
Health agreed to accept the dates of the marriage ceremonies, which all
occurred before the ban on same-sex marriage was declared unconstitutional,
as the legal dates of the marriages. 164
Administrative backdating in Texas occurred shortly after the issuance of
the Texas court decision that retroactively recognized a common law same-sex
marriage formed before the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the state's ban on
same-sex marriage. A couple in Texas sought to file a "Declaration of Informal
Marriage" with a county clerk using 1992-the year their relationship
commenced-rather than 2015, the date same-sex marriage became lawful in
Texas.165 After initially rebuffing the couple, the Texas Department of State
Health Services issued guidance indicating that same-sex couples were entitled

159. See Commonwealth, Dep't of Health v. Hanes, 78 A3d 676, 678-81 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2013).
160. See id. at 692-94.
161. See Whitewood v. Wolf 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
162. See Whitewood v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Health, 2015 WL 4547750 (3d Cir. July 29, 2015).
163. See Jim Melwert, Same-Sex Couples Who Got Married On Licenses Issued In Montco
Before Ban Was Struck Down Can Keep Anniversary Date, CBS PHILLY (Dec. 2, 2015),
http://philadelphiacbslocal.com/2015/12/02/same-sex-couples-who-got-married-on-licenses-issuedin-montco-before-states-ban-was-struck-down-can-keep-anniversary-date
[https://perma.cc/97T6NY92] (last visited Dec. 7, 2015); Same-sex Couples MarriedBefore Pa. Ban Was Overturned Can
Keep
Original
Anniversary
Dates,
PENN
LIvE
(Dec.
1,
2015),
http://www.pennlive.com/news/2015/12/same-sexmarriage-pa.anniversa.html
[https://perma.cc/6PS7-Q7T8] (last visited Dec. 7, 2015).
164. See supra note 163.
165. See Anna M. Tinsley, Second Chance Success: Same-Sex Texas Couple's Union Becomes
Common Law Marriage,STAR-TELEGRAM (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.star-telegram.com/news/
politics-government/article36864789.html [https://perma.cc/J9R2-MVXC]
(last visited Nov. 27, 2015).
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to use the date their relationship began, rather than the date when courts
deemed same-sex marriage a constitutional right. 166
D. Backdating in the Post-Loving Era
The long delay in recognizing same-sex couples' right to marry is
unusual, but it is not wholly without precedent. Backdating was applied after
the historical ban on interracial marriage in the United States ended in 1967.
That year, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Loving v. Virginia,167 held that state laws
prohibiting interracial marriage violated the equal protection and due process
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the post-Loving era, there were interracial couples whose relationships
would have been recognized in their home states as marriages-common law
or ceremonial-but for the past state laws prohibiting interracial marriages.
Moreover, in some instances, one of the two partners to the relationship died
before Loving invalidated those state laws. During that era, as in the current
one, administrative and judicial marriage backdating occurred sporadically.
. In the administrative context, the SSA issued regulations post-Loving
making clear that, in applying the valid marriage test to interracial marriages, it
would do so without reference to the state's anti-miscegenation law. It would
thus backdate the marriage to the date when the other requirements of state law
for forming a marriage were satisfied.168 In the judicial context, courts
retroactively applied 169 -or at least entertained the retroactive application
ofl 70 -Loving to recognize as valid common law interracial marriages even
where one of the two partners had died before Loving. In one case-involving
Texas law-a federal court held that in applying the criteria for establishing a
common law marriage, it would simply ignore the prohibition on interracial
marriage. 171 In the other case, a federal court applied Loving retroactively but
concluded that the couple did not satisfy the remaining criteria for establishing
a common law marriage under Mississippi law.1 72 In sum, the backdating of
166. See id.
167. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
168. See SSR 67-56, 1967 WL 2993. The SSA recently announced that it intends to issue
similar regulations regarding same-sex marriage. See Tara Siegal Bernard, Gay Couples Are Eligible
for Social Security Benefits, US. Decides, N.Y. TvIES (Aug. 20, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/2 1/business/
gay-couples-are-eligible-for-benefits-us-decides.html [https://perma.cc/NK9N-CDBH] (last visited
Nov. 29, 2015); Susan Sommer, SSA Tells Court It Will Apply Obergefell Retroactively to Grant
Spousal Benefits In Lambda Legal Case, LAMBDA LEGAL (Aug.
20,
2015),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20150820 ssa-apply-obergefell-retroactively-spousal-benefits
[https://permacc/VFP9-AAXW] (last visited Nov. 29, 2015).
169. See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lewis, 306 F. Supp. 1177, 1183 (N.D. Ala. 1969).
170. See Vetrano v. Gardner, 290 F. Supp. 200,203-06 (N.D. Miss. 1968).
171. See Lewis, 306 F. Supp. at 1183.
172. See Vetrano, 290 F. Supp. at 203-06. The court rejected an argument that fear of criminal
prosecution pre-Loving excused the couple from the duty of holding themselves out as married.
See id. at 206.
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marriages after a longstanding barrier to marriage is declared unconstitutional,
while an unusual practice in the United States, is not unprecedented.

III.
A

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BACKDATING

The sporadic discretionary legislative, administrative, and judicial
backdating of same-sex marriages described in Part II are a good second stepfollowing full marriage equality-toward making same-sex couples whole for
the injuries caused by state and federal laws prohibiting and refusing to
recognize same-sex marriages. Yet by virtue of their discretionary nature,
backdating remedies are not available to all same-sex couples nationwide.
Moreover, even when discretion is exercised, it does not always relate back to
the couple's true but-for marriage date.
This Section takes the concept of marriage backdating a step further.
Applying general principles of constitutional retroactivity and the scope of
remedial relief for constitutional violations, it demonstrates that Obergefell
applies not merely prospectively but also retroactively. Relying on these
general principles, it contends that, subject only to procedural bars to reliefsuch as res judicata and statutes of limitation-same-sex couples possess a
constitutional right to have their marriages backdated to the date they would
have married one another but for the existence of a legal barrier to doing so. If
such backdating is not administratively feasible, couples are at least entitled to
its functional equivalent.
A.

GeneralRetroactivityPrinciples

The U.S. Supreme Court has developed separate sets of principles
regarding the retroactivity of its decisions in criminal and civil cases. As a
general rule, the Court has treated its judicial pronouncements-particularly
those on matters of constitutional law-as not merely prospective, but also
retroactive in nature."' Over a century ago, the Court explained, "An
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed." 7 4
However, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Court recognized two exceptions to
this general principle. First, the Court declared that when it announced a new
constitutional rule of criminal procedure, whether it would apply retroactively
to other cases pending on either direct or habeas review turned on three factors:
(1) the purpose served by the new rule; (2) the extent of reliance on the old
rule; and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of applying the standard

173. See Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507 (1973); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 62223 (1965).
174. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425,442 (1886).
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retroactively.1 5 Second, the Court declared that in civil cases, the decision
whether to retroactively apply new principles of law turned on a different set of
three factors: (1) whether the decision overruled past precedent on which
litigants may have relied or resolved an issue of first impression whose
resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; (2) whether retroactive application
would further or retard the new rule's operation; and (3) the inequity imposed
by retroactive application. 176
Yet beginning in 1987, with its decision in Griffith v. Kentucky, 77 the
Court significantly altered retroactivity principles in the criminal context.
Under Griffith, in criminal cases, newly announced decisions always apply
retroactively to those criminal cases still on direct review.' 78 If the new
principle was announced only after a given defendant exhausted his direct
review options, it could still apply retroactively even to such cases on habeas
review in one of two circumstances. First, if the new principle is substantive in
nature-in the sense that it either interprets a criminal statute narrowly to
exclude certain conduct from its scope, or declares as a matter of constitutional
law that the particular conduct or persons covered by the statute are beyond the
state's power to punish-it will be applied retroactively to cases on habeas
review.1 79 For example, Loving declared it beyond the power of states to
criminalize interracial marriages.' 8 0 If in contrast the new principle is merely
proceduralin nature, it will be applied retroactively to cases on habeas review
only in the extremely rare circumstance that the Court characterizes the
principle as a watershed rule of criminal procedure that implicates the
fundamental fairness or accuracy of criminal proceedings.' 8 1
Soon after Griffith, the Court also significantly altered its retroactivity
principles in the civil context. In Harperv. Virginia Departmentof Taxation,182
the Court described its new civil retroactivity principles as follows:
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it,
that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be
given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and
as to all events, regardlessof whether such events predate or postdate
our announcement of the rule.183

175. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296-301 (1967); Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636.
176. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971).
177. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
178. See id. at 328.
179. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-52 (2004); see also Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality opinion).
180. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692-93 & n.7 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). The Court favorably cited Justice Harlan's opinion when it announced
its general principles of retroactivity. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
181. See Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352; Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-16.
182.
509 U.S. 86 (1993).
183. Id. at 97 (emphasis added).
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The new standard thus made clear that when the Court decides a question of
federal law, that holding applies retroactively not only to all civil cases still
1 84
pending on direct review, but also to events that predate the Court's decision.
As Justice Antonin Scalia described the new standard, if the Court declares a
law unconstitutional, lower courts are to proceed in subsequent litigation as
though that law never existed:
A court does not-in the nature of things it can not-give a "remedy"
for an unconstitutional statute, since an unconstitutional statute is not
in itself a cognizable "wrong." (If it were, every citizen would have
standing to challenge every law.) In fact, what a court does with regard
to an unconstitutional law is simply to ignore it. It decides the case
"disregarding the [unconstitutional] law," Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137, 178 (1803) (emphasis added), because a law repugnant to
the Constitution "is void, and is as no law," Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S.
371, 376 (1880). Thus, if a plaintiff seeks the return of money taken by
the government in reliance on an unconstitutional tax law, the court
ignores the tax law, finds the taking of the property therefore wrongful,
and provides a remedy. Or if a plaintiff seeks to enjoin acts, harmful to
him, about to be taken by a government officer under an
unconstitutional regulatory statute, "the court enjoins, in effect, not the
execution of the statute, but the acts of the official, the statute
notwithstanding."1 85
Although the standard of retroactivity in civil cases would appear to leave
governmental bodies open to seemingly unlimited retroactive liability for any
actions they took in reliance on a law subsequently deemed unconstitutional,
the Court has been careful to explain that retroactivity in civil cases is limited
by the need for finality. States can achieve this by enforcing procedural rules
like res judicata, statutes of limitation, and laws requiring parties aggrieved by
a law to provide timely notice of their objection.'8 6 The Court assesses the
reasonableness of such procedural bars to relief as a matter of procedural due
process, 87 and assuming they pass constitutional muster, retroactivity of newly

184. See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 752 (1995) ("[W]hen (1) the Court
decides a case and applies the (new) legal rule of that case to the parties before it, then (2) it and other
courts must treat that same (new) legal rule as 'retroactive,' applying it, for example, to all pending
cases, whether or not those cases involve predecision events.").
185. Id. at 759-60 (Scalia, J., concurring).
186. See id. at 756 ("Suppose a State collects taxes under a taxing statute that this Court later
holds unconstitutional. Taxpayers then sue for a refund of the unconstitutionally collected taxes.
Retroactive application of the Court's holding would seem to entitle the taxpayers to a refund of taxes.
But what if a pre-existing, separate, independent rule of state law, having nothing to do with
retroactivity-a rule containing certain procedural requirements for any refund suit-nonetheless
barred the taxpayers' refund suit? Depending upon whether or not this independent rule satisfied other
provisions of the Constitution, it could independently bar the taxpayers' refund claim."); see also
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 541 (1991); McKesson Corp. v. Div. of
Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Dep't of Bus. Regulation of Fla., 496 U.S. 18, 45 (1990).
187. See McKesson Corp., 496 U.S. at 49-51.
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announced principles in civil cases cannot reopen a door closed by such
procedural rules.188
B.

GeneralPrincipleson the Scope ofRemedial Relief

When the U.S. Supreme Court has invoked the Reconstruction
Amendments to strike down laws that discriminate against discrete groups like
women and African Americans, the Court has held that the remedial relief must
be crafted so as to "make whole" the victims of unconstitutional discriminatory
conduct. The scope of relief afforded to victims of such discrimination is not
limited to a declaration not to perpetuate such discriminatory conduct in the
future. Rather, relief must put victims in the same position they would have
been in but for the discriminatory conduct.
Thus, for example, in Louisiana v. United States,'89 the Court declared
unconstitutional-pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment-a highly subjective
"interpretation test" that allowed voting registrars to deny the right to register
to vote to anyone who could not give a reasonable interpretation of any clause
in the state or federal constitutions when asked.190 With respect to the scope of
remedial relief, the Court noted that "the court has not merely the power but the
duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the
discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the
future."' 91 Accordingly, the Court held it appropriate to order the state to delay
implementation of a new, uniform, and objective test for prospective voters. 192
The Court reasoned that because the old test was applied in a way that
discriminated in favor of white applicants and against African American
applicants, and because the state was not requiring everyone to reregister and
take the new test, allowing the state to apply the new test to unregistered voters
(who were predominantly African American) would perpetuate the effects of
the past discrimination. 193 It thus held that the state would have to postpone the
test unless and until it ordered "a complete reregistration of voters, so that the
new test will apply alike to all or to none." 194
Similarly, the Court, following its declaration in Brown v. Board of
Education'95 that segregated schools violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, made clear in Milliken v. Bradley'96 that in enforcing
Brown, the federal courts were not limited to merely ordering schools to cease
engaging in such discriminatory action. The federal courts could also order the
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See JamesB. Beam DistillingCo., 501 U.S. at 541.
380 U.S. 145 (1965).
See id. at 152-53.
Id. at 154 (emphasis added).
See id. at 154-55.
See id.
Id. at 155.
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
433 U.S. 267 (1977).
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offending schools to implement remedial education programs designed to undo
the effects of the prior discriminatory scheme. 197 The Milliken Court held that
to implement the Brown decision fully, courts were empowered to order such
action as they deemed necessary to "make whole" the victims of the pre-Brown
discriminatory conduct by restoring them to the position they would have
occupied in the absence of such conduct. 198
The Court reiterated these general principles in its 1996 decision in
United States v. Virginia,199 which declared that excluding women from the
Virginia Military Institute violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court
wrote that remedial decrees for constitutional violations "must be shaped to
place persons unconstitutionally denied an opportunity or advantage 2 in 'the
position they would have occupied in the absence of [discrimination]."' 00
Although these specific cases arose in the context of groups that have
traditionally received heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause,
the Court's holdings regarding the scope of remedial relief were not tied to that
fact. Rather, the Court described the remedy of restoring victims of
unconstitutional discrimination to the position that they would have occupied
20 1
but for the discrimination as animated by general equitable principles.
C.

The Right ofSame-Sex Couples to Retroactive, "Make Whole" Relief

Applying the U.S. Supreme Court's general principles regarding the
retroactivity of its federal law pronouncements, coupled with its
pronouncements on the scope of remedial relief granted when constitutional
rights are infringed, leads to two propositions regarding the impact of the
Court's Obergefell decision. First, the various methods of discretionary
marriage backdating for same-sex couples delineated above are in truth not
merely discretionary, but rather are constitutionally compelled. Second, to the
extent that-due to the minimum marriage length requirements associated with
certain benefits-these methods of backdating fail to place a given same-sex
couple in the same position they would have been in but for the bans on samesex marriage, courts are empowered to craft alternative remedies calculated to
put them in that position.
1.

Retroactive Relief

The first proposition, which flows from the Court's retroactivity
jurisprudence in civil cases,2 02 is that same-sex couples are constitutionally

197. See id. at 279-88.
198. See id. at 280 & n.15.
199. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
200. Id. at 547.
201. See, e.g., Milliken, 433 U.S. at 279-80.
202. Virtually all of the rights detailed in Part I of this Article would arise, if at all, only in civil
litigation. The one exception-the marital communications privilege-could arise in a criminal case,
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entitled to have the Obergefell decision applied retroactively, meaning that in
some circumstances they are entitled to have their marriage date backdated.
Four reference points have been used in administrative, legislative, and
judicial contexts to backdate a same-sex marriage. These include (1) the date
the couple satisfied the requirements for forming a common law marriage but
for the fact that they were of the same sex; (2) the date the couple entered into a
civil union or other formalized nonmarital relationship; (3) the date the couple
went through a religious marriage ceremony; and (4) the date the couple
received and acted upon a marriage license issued by local officials who
concluded that bans on same-sex marriage were unconstitutional. If a person
litigates the validity and legal date of their same-sex marriage with any
governmental entity, the court should-at a minimum-use the earliest of any
of these four reference points to determine the marriage's validity and legal
date.
Taking as the simplest example the first reference point-adjudication of
whether a common law marriage was formed-the court should apply
Obergefell retroactively to determine the validity and legal date of the
marriage. As Harpermakes clear, new pronouncements of federal law apply to
events that predate the Court's pronouncement.20 3 Or to paraphrase Justice
Scalia, in determining whether the couple formed a common law marriage, a
court should proceed as though the prohibition on same-sex marriage never
existed.2 04 Indeed, the post-Loving cases did so explicitly in retroactively
recognizing interracial common law marriages, 205 and the Pennsylvania, Texas,
and Utah decisions recounted in Part II did so implicitly in retroactively
recognizing common law same-sex marriages post-Obergefell.20 6
One can make a similar-albeit more nuanced-argument that retroactive
application of Obergefell should lead a court to use the second or third
reference points as the legal date of a couple's marriage. With respect to the
date a couple entered into a civil union or other formalized nonmarital
relationship, 207 state governments acted unconstitutionally by issuing different
but so long as the case is still on direct review, Obergefell would apply retroactively. See supra text
accompanying note 178.
203. See supra notes 182-84.
204. See supra note 185.
205. See supra notes 169-72.
206. See supra notes 118-36. The attorney representing the surviving partner in the Texas
litigation made specific citation to the Supreme Court's retroactivity jurisprudence detailed above. See
Sonemaly Phrasavath's Response to Motions for Summary Judgment, In re Estate of Powell, No. C-1PB-14-001695 (Tex. Prob. Ct. 2015).
207. Although the formalized nonmarital relationship would typically be a civil union, domestic
partnership or other marriage-like relationship, different types of formalized relationships are possible.
In the past, for example, some same-sex couples formalized their relationship by having one partner
legally adopt the other partner so that in the event of the death of one partner, the other would be
entitled to certain legal protections associated with a parent-child relationship. Post-Obergefell, such
couples could contend that courts should undo the adoption and treat the couple as retroactively
married using the date of the adult adoption as the appropriate reference point for backdating. See
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documentation-certificates of civil unions versus marriage certificates-to
same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples, respectively, for essentially
Applying Obergefell
identical relationship recognition applications.
retroactively, a court should ignore the unconstitutional separate-but-equal
scheme and conclude that upon receipt of the paperwork, the state should have
issued the same-sex couple a marriage certificate.
In a similar vein, courts should treat the date when a same-sex couple held
a marriage ceremony officiated by a religious official as the legal date of the
couple's civil marriage. In every state in the United States, religious officials
are authorized to solemnize civil marriages. 208 Historically, when opposite-sex
couples opt for a religious marriage ceremony, the religious official serves
double duty as both the overseer of the religious marriage and the person who
solemnizes the civil marriage. Only because of state laws prohibiting same-sex
marriage were the religious marriages of same-sex couples not recognized as
valid civil marriages. Accordingly, a court applying Obergefell retroactively
should ignore the past law prohibiting same-sex marriage and give the religious
marriage the legal force it otherwise warranted.
What makes these second and third reference points somewhat more
attenuated than the first is that the parties' intent to form a civil marriage is less
certain. Mutual intent and agreement to form a marriage is a core element of a
common law marriage, so the parties' intent is necessarily clear if they are in a
common law marriage. 209 In contrast, it is conceivable that one or both parties
to a domestic partnership or civil union may have entered it knowing, say, that
the relationship was not recognized as a marriage for federal purposes, which
they might have found appealing for tax or other financial reasons. 2 10 It is
likewise possible that a same-sex couple who participated in a religious
ceremony was seeking only religious, not civil, recognition of their
relationship. We would, of course, be more certain of the parties' intent to enter
into a civil marriage had they first applied for a civil marriage license and been
rebuffed. However, just as a couple's failure to apply for a marriage license
does not necessarily deny them standing to challenge the constitutionality of

generallyJohn Culhane, Before Marriage Was Possible, Gay People Adopted One Another. Now Sons
2015),
10,
(Nov.
SLATE
Husbands,
Become
to
Need
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/1 1/10/adult-adoptionfor-gay-couples-canthe-adoptions
_be undonejfor-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/77PA-VCLT] (last visited Oct. 13, 2016); Elon
Green, The Lost History of Gay Adult Adoption, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/19/magazine/the-lost-history-of-gay-adult-adoption.html
[https://perma.cc/BFG2-76S8] (last visited Oct. 13, 2016).
208. See Andrew C. Stevens, By the Power Vested in Me? Licensing Religious Officials to
Solemnize Marriage in the Age ofSame-Sex Marriage,63 EMORY L.J. 979, 981 (2014); see also Perry
Dane, A Holy SecularInstitution, 58 EMORY L.J. 1123, 1137 (2009).
209. See supra note 110.
210. See, e.g., Barbara K. Lundergan, Love, Marriage, and the IRS: Tax Advantages ofillinois
Civil Unions, 100 ILL. B.J. 200 (2012).
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laws prohibiting same-sex marriage,2 11 it likewise should not prevent a court
from using the second and third reference points as the likely dates of the
couple's but-for marriage. Although theoretically possible, the likelihood that a
same-sex couple wanted a civil union or a religious marriage but not a civil
marriage seems sufficiently remote that intent should be presumed in the
absence of counterproof. At the very least, a court should entertain additional
evidence in support of the couple's likely intent like it would were it
adjudicating the validity of a common law marriage.2 12
In contrast, with the fourth reference point-relating the marriage back to
the date some same-sex couples received and acted upon marriage licenses
briefly issued by a small group of local officials in California, New York,
Oregon, and Pennsylvania-the couples' intent to marry seems ironclad. 2 13
Upon learning that marriage licenses were available, these couples rushed to
the local offices, submitted their fees and paperwork, had their marriages
officiated, and returned the paperwork in the hopes of receiving a marriage
certificate. 214 Retroactive application of Obergefell should result in validating
the marriages retroactive to that date, since a court adjudicating the validity of
the marriages would disregard any prohibitions on same-sex marriage extant at
the time the couples purported to marry.

211.

A plaintiff need not engage in a "futile" act to establish standing. See PETER NICOLAS,

SEXUAL ORIENTATION, GENDER IDENTITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION 59 n.2 (2013) (citing Howard v.

N.J. Dep't of Civil. Serv., 667 F.2d 1099, 1103 (3d Cir. 1981)); Hailes v. United Air Lines, 464 F.2d
1006, 1008-09 (5th Cir. 1972)).
212. In the face of significant uncertainty, it might be prudent for a court to distinguish between
rights vis-i-vis the government-such as social security benefits-and rights as between the parties to
the alleged marriage itself, such as alimony, or rights as against third parties, such as intestate
succession. Where rights vis-A-vis the government are involved, erring on the side of recognizing the
marriage might in some instances provide a windfall to one of the partners, but it does not result in
harm to the other partner or to other private parties. In contrast, where the rights are as between the
parties themselves (or as against third parties), it is appropriate to require more exacting proof of the
relationship because recognizing the marriage could provide a windfall to one private party at the
expense of the other. Cf Lake v. Putnam, 2016 WL 3606081 (Mich. Ct. App. July 5, 2016) (declining
to treat the couple as retroactively married for purposes of determining parentage rights and holding
that "we simply do not believe it is appropriate for courts to retroactively impose the legal
ramifications of marriage onto unmarried couples several years after their relationship has ended"); id.
(Shapiro, J., concurring) ("My colleagues are rightfully concerned about retroactively imposing
marriage on a same-sex couple simply because one party now desires that we do so. However, that
concern is fully addressed by a factual inquiry into the facts as they existed at the time the child was
born or conceived. The question is whether the parties would have married before the child's birth or
conception but did not because of the unconstitutional laws preventing them from doing so.").
213. See In re Madrone, 350 P.3d 495, 501 (Or. Ct. App. 2015) ("Whether a particular couple
would have chosen to be married, at a particular point in time, is a question of fact. In some cases, the
answer to that question will be obvious and not in dispute. For example, there was no disputing that
the parties in Shineovich would have chosen to marry-they actually did make that choice, and were
not legally married only because their marriage was later declared void ab initio.") (citing Shineovich
& Kemp, 214 P.3d 29, 32 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that the couple purported to marry after
receiving a marriage license from Multnomah County, Oregon that was subsequently deemed
improperly issued)).
214. See supra note 76.
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However, the fourth reference point is complicated by pre-Obergefell
litigation involving the validity of the clerks' actions, and in some cases, the
validity of the marriages themselves. 2 15 Accordingly, it is conceivable that
despite the general rule of retroactivity, a court might conclude that res
judicata-a procedural bar to retroactivity- prevents it from reconsidering the
issue.216
The doctrine of res judicata encompasses the related doctrines of claim
and issue preclusion. 2 17 Claim preclusion forecloses relitigation of a previously
adjudicated claim, regardless of whether the subsequent litigation raises the
same or different issues. 2 18 in contrast, issue preclusion bars relitigation of an
issue of fact or law resolved in prior litigation, even if the issue arises in a case
involving a different claim.2 19 However, subject to limited exceptions not
applicable in any of the cases in the four states where clerks temporarily issued
licenses, these doctrines cannot be invoked against those who were not parties
22 0
to the earlier proceeding in which a given claim or issue was adjudicated. A
state court's application of the doctrines to those who were not parties to the
prior litigation would violate the procedural due process rights of such
parties. 22 1
In the California, New York, and Pennsylvania proceedings, none of the
same-sex couples to whom marriage licenses had been issued were parties to
the litigation, which involved the local officials as defendants and other
government officials as plaintiffs. 222 Indeed, for this reason, the New York and
Pennsylvania courts declined to address the validity of the couples' marriage
licenses. Instead, the courts ruled that the local officials' actions were unlawful
and enjoined them from continuing to issue marriage licenses. The courts also
held that the validity of the marriage licenses was properly adjudicated in
223
separate proceedings involving the purportedly married couples themselves.
The majority opinion in the California proceeding addressed the validity of the
2 24
marriage licenses and declared them to be of no legal effect, but its decision
to reach the issue was criticized by several of the concurring opinions in that
case, some of which noted that doing so violated the procedural due process

&

215. See infra text accompanying notes 222-31.
216. See supra notes 186-88.
217. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008).
218. See id.; see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979).
219. See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892.
220. See id. at 892-93.
221. See id. at 892; Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 39-46 (1940).
222. See Commonwealth, Dep't of Health v. Hanes, 78 A.3d 676, 692-94 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2013); see also Hebel v. West, 803 N.Y.S.2d 242, 244-45, 248 (App. Div. 2005); Lockyer v. City
County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 494-98 (Cal. 2004).
223. See Hanes, 78 A.3d at 692-94; see also Hebel, 803 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
224. See Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 495-98.
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rights of the purportedly married couples.225 Because applying res judicata to
the nonparty couples in these three states would violate established principles
of procedural due process, these earlier decisions cannot bar retroactive
application of Obergefell to declare their marriages valid.22 6
In contrast, the Oregon proceedings did include at least some of the samesex couples whose marriage licenses were at issue. Specifically, the case was
brought by nine same-sex couples who had been issued marriage licenses
against state officials who refused to recognize the marriages. The couples
sought a declaration that the marriages were valid and that the state's law
prohibiting same-sex marriage was unconstitutional. 227 The court found for the
state officials and declared the couples' marriages invalid. 228 Although the
couples did not specifically claim that the state's refusal to recognize the
marriages violated the U.S.-as opposed to merely the Oregon-Constitution,
res judicata would likely preclude them from relitigating the validity of the
marriage licenses, since the doctrine encompasses not only those claims
actually raised but also those that could have been raised in the earlier
proceeding. 229 Moreover, had the couples filed the challenge as a class action,
the judgment could have constitutionally bound all three thousand Oregon
same-sex couples who received marriage licenses in 2004, since class actions
are a recognized exception to the general rule that res judicata cannot be
applied to those who were not parties to the earlier proceedings. 23 0 However,
because only nine of the three thousand couples were parties to the Oregon
proceedings and because the case was not a class action, the decision cannot
bar retroactively applying Obergefell to declare valid the remaining Oregon
marriages that took place in 2004.231

225. See id. at 507-08 (Kennard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 508-10
(Werdegar, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384,
454-55 (Cal. 2008) (Kennard, J., concurring). The majority may have been willing to address the
validity of the marriage licenses because, in part, it did not have the benefit of the U.S. Supreme
Court's later decision in Taylor that rejected an open-ended "virtual representation" exception to the
general rule against nonparty preclusion that had been recognized by some lower federal courts. See
Taylor, 553 U.S. at 895-901. Although Taylor was nominally a decision about the federal common
law of preclusion doctrine-which is not binding on the states-the Court's interpretation of federal
common law in that case was clearly informed by due process considerations, which are binding on
the states. See id. at 892-901; see also Kathleen M. McGinnis, Revisiting Claim and Issue Preclusion
in Washington, 90 WASH. L. REv. 75, 127-29 (2015) (so contending and collecting cases and
secondary sources in support of that interpretation of Taylor).
226. See supra note 187.
227. See Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91, 94-95 (Or. 2005).
228.
See id. at 102.
229.
See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); see also Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94
U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876).
230.
See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894.
231.
See supra text accompanying note 221.
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"Make Whole" Relief

The second proposition-which flows from the Court's pronouncements
on remedial relief for constitutional violations-is that same-sex couples are
entitled to "make whole" relief. In other words, the remedy should put them in
the same position that they would have been in but for the existence of the
constitutionally infirm prohibitions on same-sex marriage. Yet reliance on the
four reference points for backdating same-sex marriages delineated in the
previous Section, standing alone, will fail to fully effectuate the Obergefell
decision. Using them will not put all same-sex couples in the same position
they would have been in but for the bans on same-sex marriage. Accordingly,
where rights associated with same-sex marriage are involved, courts and
policymakers need to consider alternative remedial schemes.
One problem with the four reference points is that not every same-sex
couple has all or any of these reference points available. The first is available
only to those in the small number of states that recognize common law
marriage, while the second is available only to those in the small number of
states that previously recognized formalized, nonmarital relationships for samesex couples. The third is available only to those who subscribe to religious
marriage, while the fourth is available only to a handful of couples in the
handful of states that issued marriage licenses for a brief period of time.
Moreover, these reference points are incomplete even for couples who
have them at their disposal. In light of the legal climate, same-sex couples in
common law marriage states might have been reluctant to hold themselves out
as a married couple for fear of ridicule or persecution.232 Those in states
offering civil unions or the equivalent may have opted not to enter into those
relationships either because they viewed them as inferior and were holding out
for marriage rights2 33 or were concerned by the tax and other regulatory
complexities associated with federal nonrecognition of such relationships. 234
Believers in religious marriage may have been holding out for a wedding that
would have both religious and civil significance. And those whose local
officials were willing to issue marriage licenses may have wanted assurance
that the officials' actions were valid before proceeding.
In addition, even for couples who have one or more of these four
reference points at their disposal and who exercise the opportunity, backdating
using solely these reference points may provide them with incomplete relief.
Many of these relationships solidified into lifelong commitments well before
domestic partnerships or civil unions came into being, or before religious
officials became open to performing same-sex weddings. To the extent that
some of the benefits associated with marriage require a fairly long
232. See Nicolas, supra note 104, at 940-43; cf Vetrano v. Gardner, 290 F. Supp. 200, 206
(N.D. Miss. 1968).
233. See Cox, supra note 69, at 723.
234. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694-95 (2013).
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relationship-ten years, for example, in the case of divorced spouse social
security benefits-using these reference points understates the true length of
their relationships and results in unfairly denying benefits.
Because the purpose of remedial relief is to "make whole" the victims of
unconstitutional discriminatory conduct--or to put them in the same position
that they would have been in but for the discriminatory conduct 2 3 5-- courts
should not deem any of these reference points decisive in determining a
couple's but-for marriage date. Rather, courts attempting to pinpoint a samesex couple's but-for marriage date should consider these reference points and
other evidence as data in hearings akin to the evidentiary hearings used to
determine whether and when a couple entered into a common law marriage. 236
Because such hearings are complex and administratively burdensome, a
court might instead opt for alternative remedies that are easier to administer. So
long as these alternative remedies are designed to give same-sex couples the
benefit of the doubt, 237 they could likewise provide them with "make whole"
relief while simultaneously easing the burden on courts and administrative
agencies. Two examples of alternate remedies are a presumption and the
temporary suspension of minimum marriage length requirements.
Presumptions are tools that courts, legislative bodies, or administrative
agencies can create to help them make factual determinations in the face of
uncertain evidence. With a presumption, upon proof of a basic fact or facts, the
trier of fact is required to draw a particular conclusion-the presumed fact-in
the absence of counterproof.2 3 8 For example, if a person has been absent
without tidings for seven years (basic fact), they are presumed to be dead

235. See supra notes 189-201.
236. See, e.g., In re Madrone, 350 P.3d 495, 501-02 (Or. Ct App. 2015) ("Whether a particular
couple would have chosen to be married, at a particular point in time, is a question of fact.... A
number of factors may be relevant to the fact finder's determination. A couple's decision to take
advantage of other options giving legal recognition to their relationship-such as entering into a
registered domestic partnership or marriage when those choices become available-may be
particularly significant. Other factors include whether the parties held each other out as spouses;
considered themselves to be spouses (legal purposes aside); had children during the relationship and
shared childrearing responsibilities; held a commitment ceremony or otherwise exchanged vows of
commitment; exchanged rings; shared a last name; commingled their assets and finances; made
significant financial decisions together; sought to adopt any children either of them may have had
before the relationship began; or attempted unsuccessfully to get married."); accord Lake v. Putnam,
2016 WL 3606081 (Mich. Ct. App. July 5, 2016) (Shapiro, J., concurring).
237. As set forth above, see supra note 212, giving the couple "the benefit of the doubt" is
much clearer when a right as against the government is involved. When the right is as against the other
partner to the alleged marriage or as against a third party, giving the benefit of the doubt to one private
party harms another. Accordingly, these alternative remedies may be most appropriate only when the
former, not the latter, is at stake.
238.

See PETER NICOLAS, EVIDENCE: A PROBLEM-BASED AND COMPARATIVE APPROACH 731

(Carolina Academic Press 3d ed. rev. printing 2014). The constitutional limitations on the use of
presumptions in civil cases are minimal. To pass constitutional muster, there need only be a "rational
connection" between the basic and presumed facts. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S.
1, 28 (1976); see also Mobile, Jackson & Kan. City R.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910).
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(presumed fact) in the absence of counterproof 239 Courts already use
presumptions in the realm of marriage validation. For example, if a person has
been married multiple times, there exists a presumption that the latest marriage
is valid, even if it is uncertain whether the earlier marriages ended in death or
divorce.240
Relying on statistical averages of the typical lapse of time between a
couple's first meeting and their marriage, a court could create (or direct the
creation of) a presumption that, upon proof that a same-sex couple dated for x
years and cohabitated (basic facts)-with x representing the average duration of
courtship-the couple would have married but for the legal prohibition.
Because it is merely a presumption, one party could provide supplementary
evidence tending to suggest that the couple would have married sooner, and the
opposing party could rebut the presumption by counterproof suggesting that the
couple would not have married or would have married later.
Alternatively, in lieu of seeking to pinpoint each same-sex couple's
specific but-for marriage date, a court might instead order a temporary
suspension of the minimum marriage length requirements for same-sex couples
and allow those requirements to be phased back in over time. After all, the
legal injury to same-sex couples is not the date printed on their marriage
certificates, but rather the consequences that flow therefrom where marriage
duration is relevant. Consider, for example, the Social Security Act's
requirement that a couple be married for a minimum of ten years in order for
one of them to receive divorced spouse benefits based on the other spouse's
earnings. 241 A couple's but-for marriage date might have been 2010, but they
were unable to legally marry until the Court's 2015 Obergefell decision. If they
divorce in 2024, neither will qualify for divorced spouse benefits even though
their marriage will have been fourteen years old had they been legally
permitted to wed in 2010.
Yet because pinpointing a couple's but-for marriage date is complex and
time consuming, a court could instead require the SSA to temporarily suspend,
and later phase back in, its ten-year minimum marriage length requirement so
far as divorced spouse benefits for same-sex couples are concerned. In other
words, for ease of administration, a court could direct the SSA to assume that
no same-sex couples had the legal right to marry until 2015 and thus to require
no minimum marriage length for those who divorced in 2015, a one-year
minimum for those who divorced in 2016, and a two-year minimum in 2017,
and to continue phasing the minimum back in until 2025, when it would return
to a ten-year minimum marriage length requirement for both same-sex and

239. See, e.g., Malone v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co, 558 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 2009).
240. See, e.g., Smith v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 1284, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Crosby v.
Ellsworth, 431 F.2d 35, 40 (9th Cir. 1970).
241. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b), (c), 416(d) (2012).
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opposite-sex couples. 242 Such a remedy would thus ensure that same-sex
243
couples are not disadvantaged due to the previous discriminatory scheme.
In sum, courts can use the breadth and flexibility inherent in their
equitable remedial powers 2 " to devise a remedy, or set of remedies, that will
simultaneously ensure "make whole" relief for all same-sex couples and
minimize the administrative burden for courts, administrative agencies, and the
couples themselves.

D.

Voluntary GovernmentalRemediation

The preceding discussion assumes the initiation of a judicial challenge to
remedy the harms associated with the historical prohibition on same-sex
marriage. However, legislators and administrative agencies need not await a
court order before crafting remedies calculated to make same-sex couples
whole. They can instead voluntarily modify their own laws or regulations to
give same-sex couples the necessary relief.
For example, a legislature in a state that otherwise does not recognize
common law marriages entered into within its borders could enact a law
retroactively recognizing only same-sex common law marriages created before
same-sex couples were lawfully permitted to enter into ceremonial marriages in

the state. Or Congress might amend the Social Security Act to suspend and
phase back in the minmum marriage length requirements for derivative

benefits-as described in the previous Section-but only for same-sex couples.
At first glance, such remedial schemes appear themselves to be
discriminatory, in the sense that they recognize same-sex but not opposite-sex

common law marriages, or because they apply a minimum marriage length
requirement to opposite-sex but not to same-sex couples. This raises the specter
that an opposite-sex couple could bring an equal protection challenge to the
constitutionality of such remedial actions. However, for a number of reasons,

courts would readily dispose of such challenges.

242. Because such an alternative remedial scheme would fail to provide relief for a couple
whose relationship ended in death or a breakup before they gained the legal right to marry, courts and
administrative agencies would still have to engage in fact finding to pinpoint such a couple's but-for
marriage date. However, that would involve a much smaller number of cases. Moreover, in such
situations, the court does not, in fact, have to retroactively deem the couple married, an awkward result
given that the couple's relationship has since ended. Rather, the court can simply extend to the couple
the specific marriage-associated right that they are seeking. See, e.g., In re Madrone, 350 P.3d 495,
501 (Or. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that the statute extending parental rights to the spouse of a person
who undergoes artificial insemination is retroactively applicable to a same-sex couple who would have
chosen to marry had same-sex marriage been legal, even though the remedy is generally not available
to unmarried couples).
243. Cf Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1965) (holding that the court has a
duty to implement a remedy that will "eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar
like discrimination in the future").
244. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
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As an initial matter, the U.S. Supreme Court has not applied anything
more rigorous than rational basis scrutiny to equal protection claims grounded
in sexual orientation discrimination. 245 Under rational basis scrutiny-which
only requires that the means employed be "rationally related" to furthering a
"legitimate" governmental interest 2 46-such remedial schemes would easily
pass muster. The Court has stated that remedying past discriminatory
governmental action is a "compelling" governmental interest when applying its
highest level of equal protection analysis, strict scrutiny, for race-based
classifications. 24 7 By definition, if such an interest is "compelling" in the strict
scrutiny context, it is also "legitimate" under rational basis review. 248
Moreover, the means-end "fit" requirement under rational basis review is quite
forgiving, permitting governmental entities to paint with a broad brush even if
the resulting scheme is overinclusive, underinclusive, or both.24 9 Thus,
although these schemes would benefit some same-sex couples whose
pinpointed but-for marriage date suggests that they should not receive such a
benefit, rational basis review allows a governmental entity to eschew case-bycase analysis in favor of a broad categorical approach in the interest of
administrative convenience. 250
Moreover, even if the Court were eventually to hold that sexual
orientation discrimination, like sex discrimination, is subject to intermediate
scrutiny-as some lower courts have held 251-that would not be fatal to the
constitutionality of such remedial schemes. Under intermediate scrutiny, a
classification will be upheld if it is "substantially related" to an "important"
governmental interest. 252 That level of scrutiny is thus more stringent than

245. See generallyPeter Nicolas, Obergefell's SquanderedPotential,6 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUT
137 (2015). Moreover, it is an open question whether discrimination between same-sex and oppositesex couples even constitutes sexual orientation discrimination for equal protection purposes. See Peter
Nicolas, Gay Rights, Equal Protection, and the Classification-FramingQuandary, 21 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 329, 338-55 (2014) [hereinafter Nicolas, Classification-Framing].
246. See FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 n.6 (1993); see also Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
247. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 910 (1996); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 497-98 (1989) (plurality opinion); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-76
(1986) (plurality opinion).
248.

See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 553-

54 (4th ed. 2011) (describing the necessary strength of a governmental interest under strict scrutiny as
greater than its strength under rational basis review); Peter Nicolas, Gayffirmative Action: The
Constitutionalityof Sexual Orientation-BasedAffirmative Action Policies, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 733,
740-41 (2015) (same). In this regard, it is worth noting that the governmental interest recognized by
the court in its race cases was not the specific interest in remedying past race-based governmental
discrimination, but rather the more general interest in remedying past governmental discrimination,
which would apply to race-based and sexual orientation-based discrimination alike. See, e.g., Parents
Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (plurality opinion).
249. See generally Nicolas, supra note 248, at 768-71.
250. See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 637-43 (1986).
251. See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir. 2012), aff d, 133 S. Ct.
2675, 2683 (2013).
252. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
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rational basis, both in terms of the strength of the governmental interest
required ("important" versus "legitimate") as well as the means-end fit
("substantially related" versus "rationally related").253
Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Court has held that remedial schemes
that compensate women for prior discrimination further an "important"
governmental interest. 25 4 For example, in Schlesinger v. Ballard,255 the Court
upheld a statutory scheme that required the discharge of male officers who had
served nine years without being promoted, but allowed female officers a
thirteen-year period before discharge. 2 56 The Court held that due to the
historical restrictions on combat duty for women, they had fewer opportunities
for promotion than their male counterparts, which justified the additional time
to achieve promotion. 257 Additionally, in Califano v. Webster,258 the Court
upheld a Social Security Act provision that calculated benefits for women in a
more advantageous way by excluding from the benefits computation a greater
number of a female's lower-earning years than a male's lower-earning years. 259
The Court reasoned that the statutory scheme was justified as a way to
compensate women for past employment discrimination that resulted in lower
historical wages. 260 Moreover, in both Schlesinger and Califano, the Court
upheld these remedial schemes even though the means-end fits were not
perfect. The Court did not make individualized determinations about each
specific employee or applicant's actual prior discrimination or limited
261
opportunities, but instead relied on women's average or typical experiences.
The types of alternative remedial schemes for same-sex couples detailed
above are analogous to those upheld for women in Schlesinger and Califano
and thus should withstand intermediate scrutiny should courts apply that
standard to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (or should courts
deem discrimination against same-sex couples a form of sex discrimination 262).
Just as in Schlesinger and Calfano, the remedial schemes proposed above are
designed to compensate same-sex couples for past discrimination that made it
difficult or impossible to establish the sort of record that a similarly situated
opposite-sex couple could establish. Moreover, as in Schlesinger and Califano,
the remedial schemes proposed rely not on an individualized finding in each
case, but instead on the generalized experience of same-sex couples as a whole.
..253. See Nicolas, supra note 248, at 741.
254. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982); see also Califano v.
Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977).
255. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
256. See id. at 499-505.
257. See id. at 508.
258. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
259. See id. at 314-16.
260. See id. at 318-20.
261. See Calfano, 430 U.S. at 314-20; see also Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 499-505; United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 573 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
262. See generallyNicolas, Classification-Framing,supra note 245, at 355-65.
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Precedent applying intermediate scrutiny also holds that any remedial
schemes should be time-limited in nature. 2 63 The remedial schemes proposed
above satisfy this requirement as well. They either apply only to couples whose
relationships began before 2015-when same-sex couples achieved a
nationwide right to marry-or they are designed to suspend the minimum
marriage length requirements only so long as is necessary to ensure that no
same-sex couples are disadvantaged by the previous discriminatory scheme.
CONCLUSION

In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court broke important ground for same-sex
couples by ensuring their right to marry nationwide. However, merely applying
Obergefell prospectively to permit same-sex couples to lawfully wed in the
future and to exercise the rights associated with marriage fails to remedy the
constitutional injuries suffered by those couples whose relationships ended
before Obergefell, either due to a breakup or the death of one partner.
Moreover, prospectively applying Obergefell results in a continuing injury to
most other same-sex couples with respect to any marriage benefits tied to
marriage longevity.
This Article has identified a number of ways that state and federal benefits
are tied to not merely the fact, but also the length, of a couple's marriage, and
has shown how the application of minimum length requirements disadvantages
same-sex couples. It has also discussed various methods that legislators,
judges, and administrative agencies use to identify proxies for establishing a
same-sex couple's but-for marriage date and to backdate the legal date of their
marriage for purposes of determining benefits eligibility.
Furthermore, this Article has shown that because Obergefell was not
merely a prospective ruling but also a retroactive one, states and the federal
government are required to backdate the legal marriage dates of same-sex
couples to the date they would have married but for the bans on same-sex
marriage. Such backdating provides same-sex couples with the "make whole"
relief they are entitled to for past violations of their constitutional right to
marry. Alternatively, this Article has provided examples of remedial schemes
that would accomplish the same result without unduly burdening governmental
agencies and couples with complex factfinding procedures.
Although these requirements pose some short-term administrative
challenges, the challenges are surmountable, and backdating the legal marriage
dates of same-sex couples-or its functional equivalent-is the only way to
truly remedy the constitutional harms imposed by the preexisting
discriminatory scheme.

263. See Nicolas, supra note 248, at 768; cf Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341-43 (2003)
(so holding with respect to race-based affirmative action programs, where strict scrutiny is involved).
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